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JUST SAY "NO FISHING": THE LURE OF METAPHOR
Elizabeth G. Thornburg*
The phrase 'fishing expedition" is widely used in popular culture and in the law.
In the legal setting, reliance on the metaphor can act as a substitute for rigorous
analysis, disguising the factors that influence the result in a case. At best, it is un-
informative. Worse, the fishing metaphor may itself shape the court's attitude
toward the issue or claim in a lawsuit.
This Article begins by tracing the development of the "fishing expedition" metaphor
in civil cases, demonstrating how its changing uses reflect and contribute to the le-
gal controversies of each era. The policies that originally supported limited use of
the metaphor have long been rejected. The drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure tried to overcome the metaphor. Nevertheless, in contemporary cases the
prohibition of "fishing" is omnipresent.
In an overwhelming proportion of modern cases, it is plaintiffs who are said to be
"fishing," and the metaphor's concentration in certain types of cases reflects and
reinforces an anti-plaintiff bias. The Article concludes by suggesting that we reject
the fishing metaphor It has been trite for more than two hundred years. More im-
portant, the fishing metaphor may camouflage reasoning that violates the letter or
spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
"No longer can the time-honored cry of fishing expedition' serve to
preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying [the] oppo-
nent's case." (1947)'
"Plaintiffs may not conduct a fishing expedition .... (2002)2
INTRODUCTION
Someone speaking to the news media declares an inquiry to be a
"fishing expedition" nearly every day.3 This legal metaphor has
* Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law. I'm
grateful to Steve Subrin, Marc Galanter, Paul Carrington, Tom Rowe, Jeff Gaba, Rick Mar-
cus, Mary Spector, Ronnie Conway, Kate Thornburg, and the participants in SMU's faculty
forum for their helpful comments. I also thank Greg Ivy for his invaluable help in research-
ing early uses of the fishing metaphor.
1. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
2. In re Ski Train Fire, 230 F. Supp. 2d 392, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
3. See, e.g., Librarians Assail Record 'Fishing Expeditions, MSNBC.coM, June 21, 2005,
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become a cultural clich6, so often repeated that many people no
longer recognize it as a metaphor at all. It nevertheless remains a
staple of judicial opinions that condemn a discovery request or a
lawsuit as a "fishing expedition." In civil cases, the fishing meta-
phor is far from new; it appears in opinions as early as the
eighteenth century.4 Through years of procedural change, the
metaphor clings tenaciously to legal discourse. Its meaning has
changed, and the policy behind it has changed, but it has re-
mained an iconic symbol of 'now you've gone too far' for more
than two hundred and fifty years.
This phenomenon would be interesting, but not important, if
metaphors were merely pretty figures of speech. Metaphors, how-
ever, are fundamental to the way people think! Legal language,
not surprisingly, is full of metaphors: lawyers speak of a "wall of
separation" between church and state, of litigants having "stand-
ing," and of a "marketplace of ideas." Lawyers live in a world in
which "liens float, corporations reside, minds hold meetings, and
promises run with the land."6 Such metaphors help illuminate ab-
stract legal concepts by associating them with something more
familiar and concrete. They go further, however, by shaping the
way we think about those concepts. 7 For example, the war and
sports metaphors used to describe the adversary system emphasize
the competitive win-or-lose aspect of litigation and mask opportu-
nities for cooperation.! The metaphor that treats a corporation as a
"person" makes it easier to accord it attorney-client privilege 9 and
to look for its "nerve center."'0 When a metaphor dominates the
discussion of an area of law, it structures our perception of the
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at
http://www.tradifionalvalues.org/print.php?sid=2358.
4. See Buden v. Dore, (1752) 28 Eng. Rep. 284 (Ch.).
5. HAIG BOSMAJIAN, METAPHOR AND REASON IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS 38 (1992);
GEORGE LAKOFF & MARKJOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE By 3 (1980); SUSAN SONTAG, ILL-
NESS AS METAPHOR AND AIDS AND ITS METAPHORS 5 (1988) ("Of course, one cannot think
without metaphors."); Linda L. Berger, What Is the Sound of a Corporation Speaking? How Cogni-
tive Theory of Metaphor Can Help Lawyers Shape the Law, 2J. Ass'N. LEGAL WRITING DIRS. 169,
170 (2004) ("In cognitive theory, metaphor is not only a way of seeing or saying; it is a way of
thinking and knowing, the method by which we structure and reason, and it is fundamental,
not ornamental.").
6. Thomas Ross, Metaphor and Paradox, 23 GA. L. REv. 1053, 1053 (1989).
7. BernardJ. Hibbits, Making Sense of Metaphors: Visuality, Aurality, and the Reconfigura-
tion ofAmerican Legal Discourse, 16 CAIDozo L. REv. 229, 234 (1994).
8. See Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Metaphors Matter: How Images of Battle, Sports, and Sex
Shape the Adversary System, 10 WIs. WOMEN'S L.J. 225 (1995) (canvassing metaphors and sug-
gesting changes).
9. See Upiohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 391 (1981) (analogizing corporation
to human client).
10. SeeTeal Energy USA, Inc. v. GT, Inc., 369 F.3d 873, 876 (5th Cir. 2004).
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law's meaning and impact." As Lord Mansfield said, "nothing in
law is so apt to mislead as a metaphor.'
2
In the case of "fishing," reliance on the metaphor can replace
rigorous analysis, disguising the factors that influence the result in
a case. When used by the court, it is uninformative. Even worse, the
fishing metaphor may shape the court's attitude toward the issue
or claim in a lawsuit. Accusations of "fishing" also affect the posi-
tion of the litigants. Parties arguing against pleadings or discovery
employ the metaphor as a rhetorical weapon, stigmatizing their
opponents, instead of addressing and proving the merits of bur-
den, harassment, or cost.
This Article traces the development of the "fishing expedition"
metaphor in civil cases, demonstrating how its changing uses re-
flect and contribute to the legal controversies of each era. 3 After
surveying the fishing metaphor in culture generally, Part I exam-
ines the shifting legal uses of the "fishing" label in six time periods:
(1) in eighteenth-century England; (2) in the pre-Civil War United
States; (3) in the United States shortly before the advent of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; (4) during the drafting of the
Rules; (5) during the early implementation of the Rules; and (6) in
contemporary cases. For most of its life, the metaphor has been
used to condemn "fishing." During the period of the New Deal and
for several years afterward, "fishing" was acceptable. 4 Recent cases,
however, have reverted to a more skeptical view of certain types of
discovery and litigation, so cases decrying "fishing expeditions"
have returned with a vengeance.
Part II of this Article examines the impact of the fishing meta-
phor. Calling a complaint or a request for discovery a "fishing
expedition" makes the court's decision sound easy and obvious;
the 'no fishing' sign purports to be encrusted with generations of
accrued legal wisdom. Facile use of the metaphor thereby
11. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK TURNER, MORE THAN COOL REASON: A FIELD GUIDE TO
POETIC METAPHOR 63 (1989) ("Anything that we rely on constantly, unconsciously, and
automatically is so much part of us that it cannot be easily resisted, in large measure because
it is barely even noticed. To the extent that we use a ... conceptual metaphor, we accept its
validity. Consequently, when someone else uses it, we are predisposed to accept its validity.
For this reason, conventionalized... metaphors have persuasive power over us.").
12. Knox v. Gye, (1872) 5 L.R.E. & I. App. 656, 676 (H.L.) (quoting Lord Mansfield,
and attributing error in a case to the metaphoric use of the word "trustee"). See also Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 445 (1962) ("[T]he Court's ... task is not responsibly aided by the
uncritical invocation of metaphors like the 'wall of separation' .... ") (Stewart, J., dissent-
ing).
13. While the metaphor is also used in criminal cases, and in cases involving adminis-
trative subpoenas, they are beyond the scope of this Article.
14. "Fishing" may have had a narrower technical meaning in this context than one
would suppose, however. See infta text accompanying notes 148-155.
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obscures the policy tradeoffs underlying decisions about plead-
ings and discovery. In an overwhelming proportion of modern
cases, it is plaintiffs who are said to be "fishing," and the meta-
phor's concentration in certain types of cases reflects and
reinforces an anti-plaintiff bias.
The Article concludes by suggesting that the legal profession re-
consider and reject the fishing metaphor. It has been trite for more
than two hundred years 5 It leads to mangled thoughts like "the
trial court [should not] allow plaintiffs to embark on a wide-
ranging fishing expedition in hopes that there may be gold out
there somewhere.', 6 More important, the fishing metaphor may
camouflage reasoning that violates the letter or spirit of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure.
I. A HISTORY OF THE FISHING METAPHOR
A. The Fishing Metaphor in its Non-Legal Context
Literally, "fishing" means traveling to a body of water and trying
to catch the fish that live there. The history of fishing dates back to
ancient times, when people began fishing for food using bones as
hooks and lengths of vine as line. 7 Even Plato discussed fishing,
noting that one could fish with nets, baskets, hooks, or spears."'
The prioress of an English abbey documented sport fishing in a
late fifteenth-century treatise, 9 and in 1653 Izaak Walton published
his famous work, The Compleat Angler, or the Contemplative Man's Rec-
15. Renison v. Ashley, (1794) 30 Eng. Rep. 724, 725 (Ch.) ("This is another of the fish-
ing bills, that I do not like to see in this Court.") (emphasis added).
16. Monarch Assurance P.L.C. v. United States, 244 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(allowing limited further discovery regarding plaintiffs' claim that they loaned money to a
secret agent of the United States to support a clandestine CIA operation, but that the money
was never repaid). See also Forthmann v. Boyer, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 715, 721 (Ct. App. 2002)
("The trial court cannot be faulted for slamming the door on this transparent fishing expe-
dition."); Mathias Reimann, Liability for Defective Products at the Beginning of the Twenty-First
Century: Emergence of a Worldwide Standard, 51 AM.J. COMP. L. 751, 818 (2003) ("This allows
a product liability plaintiff to go on a 'fishing expedition' in the defendant's records in the
mere hope of finding a 'smoking gun.' ").
17. Jay H. Cassell, History of Fishing, http://www.activeangler.com/articles/beginners/
articles/history/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2006) (on file with the University of MichiganJournal
of Law Reform).
18. WILHELM H. WUELLNER, THE MEANING OF "FISHERS OF MEN" 13 (1967) (citing
PLATO, THE SOPHIST, available at http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/sophist.html (on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform)).
19. JULIANA BERNERS, A TREATYSE OF FYSSHYNGE WYTH AN ANGLE By DAME JULIANA
BERNERS: BEING A FACSIMILE REPRODUCTION OF THE FIRST BOOK ON THE SUBJECT OF FISH-
ING PRINTED IN ENGLAND BY WYNKYN DE WORDE AT WESTMINSTER IN 1496 (London, Elliot
Stock 1880), cited in Cassell, supra note 17.
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reation.° Whether for food or for sport, fishing generally has posi-
tive cultural associations. The phrase "fishing expedition," typed
into Google, retrieves advertisements for companies offering exotic
fishing trips.2 ' Literal references to fishing often have a reverent
quality, whether they come from journalists, philosophers, or
presidents. Tom Brokaw declared: "If fishing is a religion, fly fish-
ing is high church."2  Henry David Thoreau once pondered: "Shall
I go to heaven or a-fishing?"2 3 And Herbert Hoover affirmed on his
ninetieth birthday: "Fishing is much more than fish .... It is the
great occasion when we may return to the fine simplicity of our
forefathers."24 Further, fishing at its best is not a random, baseless
toss of hook into water but an activity requiring knowledge and
hard work. "My father was very sure about certain matters pertain-
ing to the universe. To him all good things-trout as well as eternal
salvation-come by grace, and grace comes by art, and art does not
,,25
come easy.
How, then, did the metaphoric use of fishing become so nega-
tive? From ancient times "fishing" also had a potential dark side.
Oppian, the second-century Greek poet, wrote of the "crafty de-
vices of the cunning fisher's art.,2 6 Ancient Near East literature
distinguished between good and bad "fishers," associating undesir-
able fishing with images like the "net of Hades" or the "four evil
fishers of men. 2 7 Writers in the Middle Ages perceived a danger of
sneaky indirection in metaphorical fishing. The Middle English
Dictionary defines "fishen" as:
(a) To lure or win (souls); to catch as with bait or in a net, to
hunt (for something); (b) to seek or find (an excuse, etc.).
[Ex:] "Hem that ... preche us povert and distresse, And fis-
20. IZAAK WALTON, THE COMPLEAT ANGLER, OR THE CONTEMPLATIVE MAN'S RECREA-
TION (Random House 1939) (1653).
21. See, e.g., Belize Flats Fishing Expeditions, http://www.belizeflatsfishing.com (last vis-
ited Feb. 2, 2006); Louisiana Fishing Expeditions, http://Iouisiana-fishing-expeditions.com
(last visited Feb. 2, 2006).
22. Quotation from Tom Brokaw, The Columbia World of Quotations,
http://www.bartleby.com/66/47/8347.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2006) (attributing original
citation to INT'L HERALD TRIB., Sep. 10, 1991).
23. HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN 198 (Ernest Rhys ed., J.M. Dent & Sons, Ltd.
1916) (1854).
24. Quotation from Herbert Hoover, Simpson's Contemporary Quotations,
http://www.bartleby.com/63/55/8855.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2006); see Herbert Hoover,
Wikipedia, http://en.wikiquiote.org/wiki/HerbertHoover (listing quote as "attributed")
(last visited Sep. 23, 2006).
25. NORMAN MACLEAN, A RIVER RUNS THROUGH IT 4 (1976) ("In our family, there was
no clear line between religion and fly fishing.").
26. OPPIAN, HALIEUTICA [ON FIsHING] reprinted inWUELLNER, supra note 18, at 16.
27. WUELLNER, supra note 18, at 64-88.
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shen hemsilf gret richesse With wily nettis that they caste"
[and] "Anon thei can .. Fisshe and fynde out in their enten-
cioun A couert cloude to shadwe ther tresoun."
2 1
Such metaphorical references to fishing continued in popular
literature. In Shakespeare's Merchant of Venice, one character chides
another for trying to pry speech from him by saying "fish not."29 In
fact, by Shakespeare's time the fishing metaphor was so well estab-
lished that it could be employed without actually using the word
"fishing." In Hamlet, for example, Polonius gives advice about how
a man can "worm" out information about his son by making false
statements. Polonius says:
Your bait of falsehood takes this carp of truth:
And thus do we of wisdom and of reach,
With windlasses and with assays of bias,
By indirections find directions outs°
In Samuel Richardson's Pamela, written in 1741, a character asks:
"Why... is all this fishing about for something when there is noth-
ing?"3' Small wonder, then, that the Oxford English Dictionary lists
as a figurative meaning of fishing: "of an accusation, inquiry, etc.:
Preferred or put forward in order to elicit information which can-
not be gained directly. '32 This negative version of fishing, rather
than the positive one, wormed its way into legal thought.
28. MIDDLE ENGLISH DICTIONARY 594 (Hans Kurath et al. eds., 1954).
29. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act I, sc. i, I. 101 (Jay L. Halio,
ed., Clarendon Press 1993). See also WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING act
II, sc. iii, 1. 100 (Sheldon P. Zitner ed., Clarendon Press 1993) ("Bait the hook well. This fish
will bite."). See SARA PARETSKY, FIRE SALE 289 (2005) ("You have nothing on me, not one
goddamn thing. You're fishing without worms."), for a contemporary example.
30. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act II, sc. i, II. 62-65 (G.R. Hibbard ed., Claren-
don Press 1987).
31. SAMUEL RICHARDSON, PAMELA 203 (Chadwyck-Healey 1996) (1741). In 1608, "to
go fishing" could also mean "to rob on the highways." V OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 968
(2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter OED]. The OED supports this definition with the following quo-
tation: "Soldiers, that have no means to thrive by plain dealing... go a-fishing on Salisbury
Plain." Id. (quoting Thomas Middleton, The Pennyless Parliament, in III THE HARLEIAN MIS-
CELLANY 78 (J. Malham ed. 1808-1811)).
32. OED at 969.
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B. The Fishing Metaphor in the Law
1. Eighteenth-Century England and Bills of Discovery
a. The Courts
Common law actions did not permit discovery. At law, plead-
ings served as a vehicle to prepare cases for trial by narrowing the
issues, and in pleading lawyers characterized the legal effect of al-
legations rather than revealing facts.34 Because the pleadings
revealed so little information, litigants resorted to equity courts,
which permitted an equitable bill of discovery.' The bill of discov-
ery provided access to evidence that otherwise might be
unavailable at trial.36 Equity courts required the plaintiffs plead-
ings to be quite detailed,37 and the rules required the defendant to
respond to the pleadings and attached questions.3s As equity
jurisdiction developed, interrogatories assumed a separate status
from the pleadings, but they still required the same factual specific-
ity as equity pleadings.39
Litigants could acquire only very limited kinds of information
through an equitable bill of discovery. The bill could be filed only
against parties, not "mere witnesses."0 It could not ask a party to
give information that would incriminate him.4' The bill could ask a
party to disclose "facts," but not "evidence. 42 Parties could not dis-
cover documents unless the discovering party described the
document with particularity and the interrogated party admitted to
33. See FlemingJames,Jr., Discovery, 38 YALE L.J. 746, 746 (1929).
34. Id. at 746-47.; C. C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF EQUITY PLEADING § 34, at 25-26
(2d ed. 1883); GEORGE RAGLANDJR., DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL 1-17 (1932).
35. This practice dates back to at least the mid-fifteenth century. RAGLAND, supra note
34, at 12.
36. THOMAS HARE, A TREATISE ON DISCOVERY OF EVIDENCE BY BILL AND ANSWER IN
EQUITY vii-viii (1st ed. 1836).
37. RAGLAND, supra note 34, at 6 ("Pleadings were supposed to present the facts of the
case in so complete a fashion that the court would be able to render its decision thereon.").
38. Id. at 15.
39. Id. at 16. See also Robert Wyness Millar, The Mechanism of Fact-Discovery: A Study in
Comparative Civil Procedure, 32 U. ILL. L. REV. 424, 437-42 (1937-38) (tracing development of
discovery in chancery pleadings).
40. EDWARD BRAY, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF DISCOVERY 39 (1885). Discovery
was necessary to obtain evidence from parties because parties were not allowed to testify at
trial, based on a belief that their bias made them unreliable witnesses. Non-party witnesses,
on the other hand, could testify. HARE, supra note 36, at vii-viii.
41. Id. at 104. Because of the early overlap between criminal and tort liability, there
was "some doubt as to the extent to which a court of equity would interfere to give discovery
in aid either of the prosecution of or the defense to actions for tort." Id. at 346-47.
42. Id. at 444-48.
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having the document.43 Nevertheless, the bill of discovery was far
superior to the limited utility of the bill of particulars in an action
at law.
44
Cases concerning bills of discovery are the earliest civil cases in
which the fishing metaphor appears. The earliest cases involve dis-
putes about ownership of real property. In the first, Buden v. Dore,
the plaintiff claimed tide to land, and the defendant relied on a
title inconsistent with the plaintiffs. 45 The plaintiff complained that
the defendant's answer did not set out the deeds and writings that
the defendant relied on to prove his tide. The Lord Chancellor
ruled that the defendant did not have to disclose them, saying "you
cannot come by a fishing bill in this court, and pray a discovery of
the deeds and writings of defendant's title."06 On the other hand, if
the defendant possessed deeds and writings showing the plaintiff's
tide, the court could require their disclosureY.4 The label "fishing
bill" thus represented what came to be known as the "own case"
rule: a party could discover information that would support his
own case but not information that would support his opponent's
48
case.
"Fishing bill" continued to appear in land-title disputes. In Reni-
son v. Ashley, the plaintiffs were the great-granddaughters of one
John Izzard, and they claimed to have inherited certain of his
properties.4 9 They brought suit against the woman in possession of
that property, the step-daughter of one of their deceased cousins.
The plaintiffs sought to discover the deeds and other documents
under which the step-daughter claimed title. She offered to pro-
duce a deed showing her own title but denied having any
documents that would show the plaintiffs' title. The Lord Chancel-
lor declined to order pretrial production: "This is another of the
fishing bills, that I do not like to see in this Court. A spirit of prying
into titles has got into the Court, that is highly dangerous to the
title of every man in England." °
43. Id. at 151-53.
44. See, e.g., Edson R. Sunderland, Scope and Method of Discovery Before Tia, 42 YALE L.J.
863, 865 (1933) (arguing that the bill of particulars-a request for more specific pleading-
fell short of forcing real disclosure of evidence and was a "feeble and restricted" contribu-
tion to discovery).
45. Buden v. Dore, (1752) 28 Eng. Rep. 284,284 (Ch.).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See aIsoJULIUS BYRON LEVINE, DISCOVERY: A COMPARISON BETWEEN ENGLISH AND
AMERICAN CIVIL DISCOVERY LAW WITH REFORM PROPOSALS 76, 141 n.14 (1982) (arguing
that the "fishing" objection is synonymous with the "own case" rule).
49. Renison v. Ashley, (1794) 30 Eng. Rep. 724, 724 (Ch.).
50. Id. at 725.
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The next year brought another condemnation of a "fishing bill,"
again enforcing the "own case" limitation on discovery. In Ivy v.
Kekewick, the plaintiff claimed title to an estate by descent from the
mother (ex parte materna) and asserted that there was no heir from
the father (ex parte paterna).5' The defendant, on the other hand,
claimed title by descent from the father. The plaintiff prayed that
the defendant "might set forth, in what manner he is heir ex parte
paterna, and all the particulars of the pedigree, and the times and
places or particulars of the births, baptisms, marriages, deaths or
burials, of all the persons, who shall be therein named."5 2 The Lord
Chancellor firmly rejected this request for pre-trial disclosure:
"This is a fishing bill to know, how a man makes out his title as heir.
He is to make it out: but he has no business to tell the Plaintiff,
how he is to make it out."5
Other "fishing bill" cases demonstrate that litigants also em-
ployed the "fishing" label to fight discovery. For example, Ryves v.
Ryves was a title dispute brought by the son of a first marriage
against his step-mother and half brother.4 The plaintiff's bill al-
leged the sources of his title and the extent of his estate. He prayed
that the defendants "be compelled to produce all such settlements,
deeds, indentures, wills, instruments, and writings, or such
settlement, deed, [etc.], as they or either of them may have in
their, his or her, custody or power .... " In response, the defen-
dants argued that "this is one of those vexatious fishing bills, which
have always received the disapprobation of the Court."
56
To a certain extent, the cases also protect the lawyer's privacy in
trial preparation. For example, Ivy insisted that the defendant's
evidence was not discoverable before trial and that the defendant
need not "tell the Plaintiff, how he is to make [his case] out."57 An-
other early case rejected an interrogatory that asked: "What case
do you intend to set up at the trial of this action as entitling you to
recover against the defendants therein?5 8 This request was im-
proper because "a party is not to make a fishing application as to
the manner in which his adversary intends to shape his case, and as
to the evidence by which he intends to support it." 59 The
51. Ivy v. Kekewick, (1795) 30 Eng. Rep. 839,839 (Ch.).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Ryves v. Ryves, (1797) 30 Eng. Rep. 1044, 1044 (Ch.).
55. Id. at 1045.
56. Id. at 1046.
57. Ivy v. Kekewick, (1795) 30 Eng. Rep. 839, 839 (Ch.).
58. Edwards v. Wakefield, (1856) 119 Eng. Rep. 937, 938 (Q.B.).
59. Id. at 939.
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eighteenth-century cases, then, all involved title to land, and all
invoked the fishing metaphor to enforce the "own case" rule.
b. The Commentators
Early treatises reflecting on this case law describe the fishing
metaphor as a limit on the bill of discovery. In 1836, Story re-
ported:
[N]o discovery will be compelled, except of facts material to
the case, stated by the plaintiff; for, otherwise, he might file a
bill, and insist upon a knowledge of facts wholly impertinent
to his case .... In such a case his bill would most aptly be de-
nominated a mere fishing bill.60
An influential nineteenth-century treatise on discovery identifies
"fishing actions" primarily with these land-title fights. 6' It also sug-
gests that the condemnation of "fishing" rests on concerns about
invasion of privacy, the sanctity of property, and fear of improper
motives of the plaintiffs:
Allusion has already ... been made to fishing actions .... It is
mainly in connection with the title to land that actions of this
kind have been instituted. So great is the temptation to a per-
son with some fancied claim to another person's land to get
an opportunity of ransacking his title deeds in the hope of
discovering some defect in the title that the most shadowy
cases have frequently been launched with the view of finding
out something about the title through the machinery of dis-
62
covery.
While it might seem strange to us now to think of property re-
cords as private, England did not have a general public tide
registration system until the twentieth century. Deeds and other
60. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, AS ADMINISTERED IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA § 1497, at 712 (6th ed. 1857).
61. BRAY, supra note 40, at 516.
62. Id. Bray notes that the "mischief of the exposure of documents of title extends be-
yond the particular action: for though the title might not be defective as against the
particular adversary in the action, the documents might reveal defects of which other per-
sons might take advantage." Id. He cites Buden, Renison, and Ryves to support his observation
that in "early times the judges frequently expressed their strong disapprobation of actions of
a fishing character." Id. at 517. See also HARE, supra note 36, at 184-85 (expressing similar
concerns).
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documents reflecting title were "handed from purchaser to pur-
chaser and were usually kept in boxes in the office of the owner's
solicitor."6 Disputes of this kind could also lead to an airing of the
family's secrets, such as allegations of extramarital children or ugly
disputes between step-siblings. In sum, the commentators saw the
"fishing" complaints as a limited but important check on discovery.
They were also the first to express concern about speculative litiga-
tion.
2. "Fishing" in the Pre-Civil War United States
a. The Courts
The fishing metaphor traveled to the United States with the
common law. 4 Its earliest expression in this country came in
collection cases, usually suits on notes or attempts by creditors to
reach assets through an allegation of a fraudulent conveyance.65
Discovery was still governed by the limited nature of the equity
66
rules. These cases identified "fishing" with the "own case" rule,
and they also began to criticize a perceived speculation in the
plaintiffs' requests. In these cases, the limits on discovery were
closely intertwined with requirements for particularized pleadings.
63. JESSE DUKEMINIER &JAMES KRIER, PROPERTY 688 (3d ed. 1993).
64. The metaphor is alive and well in other common law countries, too. See, e.g., B.C.
CAIRNS, AUSTRALIAN CIVIL PROCEDURE 321 (5th ed. 2002) ("A fishing interrogatory inquires
after a cause of action or defence not pleaded in the hope of discovering something that can
then be alleged as a claim or defence. It is an attempt to drag a party's files to seek out what
is there without any ground for believing that they contain relevant information.") (Austra-
lia); ARCHIBALD MACSPORRAN & ANDREW R.W. YOUNG, COMMISSION AND DILIGENCE 53
(1995) ("Indeed, it is seldom that the courts hear an opposed motion for commission and
diligence in which the phrase ['fishing diligence'] does not feature.") (Scotland); DAVID
STOCKWOOD, CIVIL LITIGATION 71 (4th ed. 1997) (noting in regard to production of docu-
ments from non-parties that "[t]he courts will not allow the rule to be used to permit a
'fishing expedition") (Canada). Other countries may recognize limits on discovery, but it
seems to be metaphor-free. See, e.g., KuO-CHANG HUANG, INTRODUCING DISCOVERY INTO
CIVIL LAW 48 n.32 (2003) ("The principle of the prohibition of probing, Verbot des Ausfor-
schungsbeweises in German, is clearly established under German civil procedure.").
65. English bill of discovery cases also began expanding into this area. See, e.g., Lush v.
Wilkinson, (1800) 5 Ves. 384, 387 (Ch.) ("It is very extraordinary for a subsequent creditor
to come with a fishing bill, in order to prove antecedent debts.").
66. Some states, like Alabama, had passed a statute allowing interrogatories in law
cases rather than forcing plaintiffs to bring a separate suit in equity, but this step did not
expand the scope of discovery. The Branch Bank at Montgomery v. Parker, 5 Ala. 731, 733
(1843). Mississippi (in 1828), Missouri (in 1835), Arkansas (in 1837), Connecticut (in 1836),
Virginia (in 1831), Georgia (in 1847), and Massachusetts (in 1851) all enacted measures allow-
ing at least some use of interrogatories in actions at law. Millar, supra note 39, at 446-47.
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The earliest case was Newkirk v. Willett, in which a widow filed a
bill of discovery against a creditor who had sued her in a law court
for money allegedly owed by her late husband.67 The widow
claimed she had no personal knowledge of the debt, and she be-
lieved it to be unjust because the creditor had never tried to collect
his claim during her husband's lifetime and he did not have writ-
ten proof of the debt. The widow asked that the creditor give her
all of the facts regarding the origin of the debt so that she could
"safely proceed to a trial" of the action at law. The court held that
she was not entitled to the information and that her request was a
"mere fishing bill" because it did not seek to substantiate her own
defense.
The plaintiff in Spence v. Duren had a similar problem. 9 He had
paid two men for land, and the men were supposed to convey good
tide to him. After he had purchased the land, however, he discov-
ered that the sellers were not the sole owners of the land. The
plaintiff sued in equity to compel the other alleged owners to dis-
close whether they claimed an interest in the land and, if so, what
their interest was. The plaintiff admitted in his bill that he did not
personally know what the interests might be. The court refused to
grant relief to the plaintiff:
[T]he bill deals in suspicions and conjectures, and on belief
founded in rumor and hearsay. Bills of this vague and uncer-
tain character, which call for a disclosure without positive and
certain allegations, have been denominated fishing bills; such
is the character of this. The rules of chancery practice re-
quire, that the facts, as to which a discovery is sought ...
should be stated with reasonable certainty and precision; that
the allegations should be direct and positive, and not uncer-
tain and inconclusive, before the defendant can be called on
to answer.70
In both of these cases, the plaintiffs' lack of information about
the defendants' claims left them without recourse in equity. Their
pleadings were rejected as insufficiently specific, and they were not
allowed to inquire into the facts supporting the claims against
them.71
67. Newkirk v. Willett, 2 Johns. Cas. 413, 413 (N.Y. 1800).
68. Id. at 416.
69. Spence v. Duren, 3 Ala. 251 (1841).
70. Id. at 253.
71. See also Goodwin v. Wood, 5 Ala. 152, 152-53 (Ala. 1843). In this action on a prom-
issory note, the defendant sent interrogatories asking the plaintiff about payments on the
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A number of the early nineteenth-century cases involve credi-
tors' attempts to reach assets by claiming that the debtor
transferred those assets fraudulently. Under the substantive law
during that period, indebtedness in any amount at the time of a
transfer would render the transfer void both as to existing and sub-
sequent creditors. Based on this law, unpaid creditors would try to
discover any and all amounts that the debtor might have owed at
the time of transferring a valuable asset. The courts referred to
these attempts as "fishing bills," and they generally rejected them
unless the creditor could identify some specific antecedent debt.
72
b. The Commentators
When explaining cases such as these, nineteenth-century trea-
tises focused on the inadequacy of the pleadings. Story's
Commentaries on Equity Pleadings, for example, discusses Newkirk to
illustrate that "the Bill [of discovery] should set forth in particular
the matters, to which the discovery is sought; for the other party is
not bound to make answer to vague and loose surmises. " 7 Simi-
larly, Bray's treatise connects the right to discovery with the
sufficiency of the discovering party's allegations. He emphasizes
that a discovering party should already have enough evidence to
state a case with particularity before equity will assist:
There is a class of actions which stand, to a certain extent,
by themselves, namely, what are called fishing actions. Discov-
ery is given in courts of equity to assist a plaintiff in proving
a known case, and not to assist him in a mere roving
note. The trial court ruled that the interrogatories did not need to be answered because the
defendant did not state the precise amount of the several payments. Id. at 155. The same
argument was used by a litigant in Smith v. Ramsey, 6 111. 373 (1844), a suit by a partner
against the heir of two former partners for his share of the land that had been conveyed to
the partnership. The lawyer for the heir argued: "The bill is wholly uncertain as to what he
claimed .... This does not even rise to the dignity of a fishing bill." Id. at 375.
72. See, e.g., Toole v. Stancill, 41 N.C. 501, 503 (1849) ("This bill is in the nature of
what are called fishing bills, which are filed to find out a creditor, whose debt existed at the
time of the execution of the conveyance, to subject the fund to all the creditors, as well
those subsequent as antecedent."); Fisk v. Slack, 38 Mass. 361, 364 (1838) (alleging a bill in
equity for an accounting of certain transactions to be a "fishing bill"); Parks v.Jewlett, 36 Va.
511, 521 (1838) (discussing the problem of creditors going after emancipated slaves by a
"fishing bill"); Hoke v. Henderson, 14 N.C. 12, 14-15 (1831) ("It is upon this foundation,
that what are called fishing bills are filed in Equity, to find out a creditor at the time of the
conveyance, and to bring the whole fund into subjection to general creditors, including
subsequent creditors, and afortiori, other creditors at the time.").
73. STORY, supra note 60, § 325, at 336.
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speculation, the object of which is to see whether he can fish
74
out a case.
Otherwise, according to Bray, anyone might discover
all the particulars of any transaction however secret and im-
portant with which he had no manner of concern merely by
introducing into his pleadings the false allegation that he had
an interest therein.... It would be a monstrous thing that a
man merely by alleging that he had a share in the concern...
could get the accounts of a defendant's private business and
of his dealings with other people.'75
The fishing metaphor saturated both the "own case" limits and the
requirement that a party have enough evidence to prove a case be-
fore filing it, in order to protect rights to property and privacy.76
Nineteenth-century commentators added another policy argu-
ment supporting the prohibition on fishing for an opponent's
evidence: fear of perjury. Writers (but not courts) expressed a con-
cern that if a litigant could discover his opponent's evidence in
advance, a dishonest person might procure evidence to undermine
it. Bray explained:
If you give one side the opportunity of knowing the particu-
lars of the evidence that is to be brought against him, then
you give a rogue an enormous advantage: he may then be able
although he has no evidence in support of his own case to
shape his case and his evidence in such a way as to defeat en-
tirely the ends ofjustice .
Others suggested that mutual discovery might actually be bene-
ficial, but they regarded the "own case" rule as too well established
to change. 8 This 'fear of perjury' explanation for the prohibition
74. BRAY, supra note 40, at 16.
75. Id. at 25.
76. FlemingJames' survey of discovery in 1927 confirmed this two-pronged version of
the fishing metaphor. James, supra note 34, at 759. He referred first to the prohibition of
"fishing expeditions" that "pry into an adversary's case." Id. He then added that "there are
other ... types of 'fishing expeditions.' The scope of an examination, an interrogation, or
an order for inspection of documents may be so broad as to amount to what some courts
call a 'roving commission.'" Id.
77. BRAY, supra note 40, at 445.
78. JAMES WIGRAM, POINTs IN THE LAw OF DISCOVERY 1 148 (1836) ("If it were now,
for the first time, to be determined-whether, in the investigation of disputed facts, truth
would best be elicited by allowing each of the contending parties to know, before the trial, in
what manner, and by what evidence, his adversary proposed to establish his own case;
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on fishing was a precursor to the argument that attorney work
product should be protected from discovery."'
3. Pre-1938 State and Federal Cases
a. Fishing is Still Forbidden
The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries witnessed con-
siderable procedural ferment, especially in the areas of pleading
and discovery.s° The most significant changes began in New York in
1848 with the adoption of the Field Code."1 The Field Code
merged law and equity, eliminated the forms of action, and di-
rected parties to plead "[f] acts constituting the cause of action" in
"ordinary and concise language."82 The Code also eliminated equi-
table bills of discovery and interrogatories as part of the equitable
bill.83 Instead, the Code provided for more informative pleadings,
some limited document production, and depositions of parties
(but only in lieu of calling them as witnesses at trial) .4 More than
half of the states adopted changes modeled on the Field Code by
the turn of the century. 5 At the same time, states began to intro-
duce more discovery devices and broaden the scope of discovery.
For example, by 1932 seven states allowed depositions from wit-
nesses as well as parties, forty-two made some provision for the
production of documents, and ten permitted written interrogato-
.86
arguments of some weight might a priori be adduced in support of the affirmative of this
important question.").
79. See, e.g., Donna Denham & Richard Bales, The Discoverability of Surveillance Videotape
Under the Federal Rules, 52 BAYLOR L. REv. 753, 767 (2000) (noting that defendants argue for
work-product protection for surveillance video because disclosure "may obviate the video-
tape's value as an impeachment tool since the plaintiff can structure her testimony
according to the evidence presented on the tape").
80. This was also a time of significant procedural reform in English courts, particularly
with the Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875, which merged law and equity, clearly separated
interrogatories from pleadings, and provided sanctions for failure to comply with discovery
See Millar, supra note 39, at 444-45.
81. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered the Common Law: The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 909, 931-39 (1987).
82. Id. at 932-39 (internal citations omitted).
83. Id. at 938.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 939 n.170 (noting that twenty-seven states had adopted similar procedures by
1897).
86. RAGLAND, supra note 34, at 51, 88, 92.
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The federal courts maintained a more conservative approach to
discovery."7 While two statutes permitted depositions in cases at law,
they did so only to provide testimony for trial when the witness was
likely to be absent." In equity cases, Equity Rule 58 provided for
limited discovery. A party could send interrogatories to opposing
parties to discover "facts and documents material to the support or
defense of the cause."8 9 Documents could be produced and in-
spected on judicial order.9° In law cases, on the other hand,
production would be ordered only at trial)' In addition, although
federal courts in common law matters generally followed state pro-
cedural rules under the Conformity Act,92 the Supreme Court
interpreted the Act to prohibit federal courts from adopting the
discovery devices of the states in which they sat9
3
Federal courts and most state courts during this period contin-
ued to condemn "fishing." Some cases used "fishing bill" to mean
that a party could not discover information supporting its oppo-
nent's case. This was criticized as both an invasion of privacy and
property rights and as interference in opposing counsel's trial
strategy. In 1911 the Supreme Court affirmed the continued vitality
of the "own case" rule in Carpenter v. Winn.94 Plaintiff Winn had ob-
tained an order from the trial court requiring defendant
Carpenter to produce certain books and papers regarding a par-
ticular brokerage transaction in cotton in 1905 and 1906. The
Court found this discovery to be improper:
[A] bill of discovery cannot be used merely for the purpose of
enabling the plaintiff.., to pry into the case of his adversary
to learn its strength or weakness. A discovery sought upon
suspicion, surmise, or vague guesses is called a 'fishing bill,'
and will be dismissed.... Such a bill must seek only evidence
which is material to the support of the complainant's own
87. SeeJames A. Pike & John W. Willis, The New Federal Deposition-Discovey Procedure: I,
38 COLUM. L. REV. 1179, 1190 (1938). During this period, the federal courts were generally
seen as protective of corporate interests. See generally Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Story of Erie,
in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 24-32 (Kevin Clermont ed., 2004).
88. 28 U.S.C. § 639 (1938) (permitting depositions "when the witness lived more than
one hundred miles from the place of trial, or was on a voyage at sea, or about to go out of
the United States, or when the witness was aged and infirm"); 28 U.S.C. § 644 (1938) (allow-
ing depositions only when "necessary to prevent a failure or delay ofjustice").
89. FED. EQUITY R. 58 (1912), in GEORGE FREDERICK RUSH, EQUITY PLEADING AND
PRACTICE 224 (1913).
90. Id.
91. Carpenter v. Winn, 221 U.S. 533,544-45 (1911).
92. Act ofJune 1, 1872, ch. 255, §§ 5-6, 17 Stat. 196, 197.
93. ExparteFisk, 113 U.S. 713, 721 (1885).
94. Carpenter, 221 U.S. at 540.
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case, and prying into the nature of his adversary's case will not
be tolerated.95
Federal courts also used the term "fishing expedition" to criti-
cize plaintiffs who sued before having a sufficiently detailed case.
After discussing the "own case" limit, the court in Goodrich Zinc
Corp. v. Carlin went on to condemn speculative litigation: "[E]ven
in an inquiry as to your own case, the questions asked must not be
'fishing'; that is, they must refer to some definite and existing state
of circumstances, and not be put merely in the hopes of discover-
ing something which may help the party interrogating to make out
some case."96 The Supreme Court had earlier criticized a creditor's
attempt to reach a wife's assets to pay her husband's debts in a
fraudulent transfer case.' The creditor could not describe the as-
sets with particularity "because all particular information is refused
by the [husband] and his wife and the persons managing the
property for them, and because the same has been invested for
income, and often changed in form by reinvestment and in pursu-
ance of devices for more effectual concealment." 8 Rather than
taking pity on the creditor, the Court called his suit a "fishing bill"
because "the substance of what they say is, that they have received
certain information which excites their suspicion; and this infor-
mation is... vague,... uncertain and indefinite.'J'
During this period most state cases used "fishing" in similar ways.
Some referred to discovery requests seeking information about an
adversary's case as "fishing expeditions."'00 Others rejected discov-
ery requests from plaintiffs believed to be suing without a sufficient
factual basis. In Phillips v. Curtis, for example, the plaintiffs alleged
that the defendants had entered into an agreement to secure a
monopoly on selling calves in certain stockyards in New York City.' '
95. Id. at 540.
96. Goodrich Zinc Corp. v. Carlin, 4 F.2d 568, 569 (W.D. Mo. 1925) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). See also Stokes Bros. Mfg. Co. v. Heller, 56 E 297 (C.C.D.N.J. 1893). In
this patent-infringement case, the court refused to allow the plaintiffs to inspect the defen-
dants' manufacturing plant because the plaintiffs had not produced "a particle of evidence"
to sustain their claims. Id. at 298. The court stated: "Under these circumstances, to compel
the defendants to open their manufactory to hostile inspection of rivals in business, and to
disclose the character of the machines and the process by which for so many years they have
made a successful article of merchandise, would be unjust and inequitable. The motion is
too obviously the excuse for a 'fishing excursion'...." Id. at 298.
97. Huntington v. Saunders, 120 U.S. 78 (1886).
98. Id. at 79.
99. Id. at 80-81. The Court went on to explain that this policy was needed to protect
wives' separate estates. Id.
100. See, e.g., DeLacyv. Walcott, 13 N.Y.S. 800,802-03 (Sup. Ct. 1891).
101. Phillips v. Curtis, 75 N.Y.S. 581, 583 (App. Div. 1902). See also McCleod v. Griffis, 8
S.W. 837 (Ark. 1888). McCleod involved a bill in chancery to impeach the settlement of an
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The defendants admitted to an agreement but denied that they
intended to monopolize. The plaintiffs tried to discover a copy of
the agreement, the defendants objected, and the court refused to
order discovery:
IT] his application is a mere expedient for the purpose of see-
ing whether they may or may not have a cause of action ....
They desire to make amongst the private papers of these de-
fendants an experimental voyage of discovery in the hope that
perhaps they may be able to fish out something they may turn
to their advantage. It does not seem to us that such a mere
fishing expedition should be countenanced by the court
,,102
The creditor (Solomon) in George v. Solomon also lost because he
lacked sufficient pre-suit information. 1°3 He alleged that he had
paid his rent twice, once to Mr. Ragsdale and then to Mrs.
Ragsdale, and there was a dispute over whether Mr. Ragsdale had
been acting as his wife's agent when collecting the $1,000 rent.
Solomon knew that either Mr. or Mrs. Ragsdale owed him a re-
fund, but he needed more information to know who should repay
him. The court described Solomon's attempt to find out as "a pure
and simple fishing bill, and complainant angles in the broadest
water." °4 Since the unhappy payor could not plead which defen-
dant owed him the money, he received no relief from the court.
An example illustrates the required degree of specificity-and
consequent limits on the scope of discovery-that were common
during this period:
[I] t may be part of a party's case to prove that his adversary's
title is defective, so that an interrogatory such as "Is there not
an outstanding mortgage to A on this land?" would be proper.
Yet to allow a party to require his adversary simply to set out
his title might be undesirable. At any rate, the courts evince a
administrator in probate court, a kind of collateral attack on the probate court judgment
requiring a showing of fraud, accident, or mistake. The plaintiffs had identified certain
frauds and mistakes and sought to inspect the books to find others. The court refused to
allow it: "In the language of ancient jurisprudence, 'the court of chancery will not entertain
a fishing bill.'" Id. at 841.
102. Phillips, 75 N.Y.S. at 582-83.
103. George v. Solomon, 14 So. 531, 533 (Miss. 1893).
104. Id. The court suggested that if equity afforded relief in this situation, "we see no
reason why the owner of lost or stolen property might not implead in one suit the residents
of a city or county upon the averment that some one of them-which one, the complainant
is not informed-has converted his property, and is liable for its value." Id.
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strong tendency to discountenance such broad interroga-
tion."°
Courts permitted discovery, then, only to enable a party to access
from the opponent otherwise unavailable but known evidence to
support its own case. Information exchange took place primarily at
trial, and plaintiffs were not supposed to file suit unless they al-
ready had enough evidence to prove a prima facie case. Attempts
to deviate from these principles were labeled "fishing."
b. Fishing Allowed
A few state decisions during this period, however, declared that
"fishing" could be a good thing. The Kansas Supreme Court in
1874 was asked to decide whether a party could compel a witness to
give his deposition before trial for discovery purposes.0 6 The court
approved of the practice: "It is . . . said that this permits one to go
on a 'fishing expedition' to ascertain his adversary's testimony. This
is an equal right of both parties, and justice will not be apt to suffer
if each party knows fully beforehand his adversary's testimony."''0 7 A
later Kansas case reached the same result and ran with the meta-
phor: "Even if they were fishing-for it is permissible in a case of
this kind-they must exercise as much cunning and circumspec-
tion as if whipping the trout streams, while trying to establish their
alleged commercial frauds. We think this case presents a justifiable
fishing expedition. '"' °8
New York courts were split on the issue. Although the courts in
Phillips and DeLacy criticized plaintiffs for "fishing," one trial court
rejected a complaint about fishing in 1899." The court explained:
105. James, supra note 34, at 759; see also Terry v. Stull, 169 A. 739, 741 (Del. Ch. 1933)
(in a case alleging fraud on the deceased, rejecting as a "fishing expedition" interrogatories
that "call[ed] on Philip B. Stull to say whether he ever turned over any money to his father,
asking for the amounts, if paid by check the names of the banks, the nature of the transac-
tions, whether he ever received any power of attorney from his father of any kind, whether
he ever acted in any way as agent for his father, and things of that sort.... Interrogatories of
that type appear to me to be shots in the dark fired in the hope that they may hit a mark.").
106. In reAbeles, 12 Kan. 451, 452 (1874). Justice David Brewer, who wrote this opinion,
later became ajustice of the United States Supreme Court. Sunderland, supra note 44, at 871.
107. In re Abeles, 12 Kan. at 453.
108. In re Merkle, 19 P. 401, 402 (Kan. 1888). When the deponent was a witness rather
than a party, however, Kansas continued to forbid the use of depositions to fish. In re Davis,
16 P. 790, 792 (Kan. 1888).
109. Compare Phillips v. Curtis, 75 N.Y.S. 581, 583 (App. Div. 1902), and DeLacy v. Wal-
cott, 13 N.Y.S. 800, 802-03 (Sup. Ct. 1891), with Hay v. Zeiger, 61 N.Y.S. 647 (Sup. Ct. 1899).
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It is said in decisions, and is now said by counsel for the de-
fendant, that [depositions] must not be 'fishing excursions.' If
a party wants to use the testimony of an opposite party to
prove a certain fact within his knowledge, I do not know why
he should not be permitted to probe his conscience for it, or
'fish' for it if the phraseology of certain decisions on appeal
must be followed. What the courts are after is the truth, and a
system of technicalities and pitfalls should not be put in the
110
way.
Despite this occasional acceptance of fishing, the "own case"
rule persisted."' Professor Sunderland suggested that the chancery
bar did not try very hard to change the rule, for reasons of its own.
First, the restrictions on discovery "produced an enormous amount
of lucrative litigation over the application of the rules."' 2 Second,
the discovery limits created enough uncertainty at trial that "a law-
yer might always feel confident of having a fighting chance of
success no matter what side of any case he might be employed to
represent.1 3 The forces of reform would soon attempt to over-
come this inertia.
4. Drafting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
By the early 1930s, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure (FRCP) was engaged in drafting what would be-
come the new pleading and discovery rules. 1 4 The Advisory
Committee did this against a background of scholarly work calling
for liberalization of pleading rules and expansion of discovery
rights. Charles Clark, the Dean of Yale Law School and Reporter to
the Advisory Committee, had condemned the wastefulness of de-
110. Hay, 61 N.Y.S. at 648; see also Pike & Willis, supra note 87, at 1194 ("The objection
to pre-action discovery on the ground that it will allow 'fishing out a case' is not particularly
sound (if the plaintiff has a case he should be aided in fishing it out) ....").
111. Sunderland, supra note 44, at 869-70. Courts did sometimes liberalize the "own
case" rule so that one's own case included negating the opponent's case. Sunderland noted
in 1933 that twelve states "make discovery available not only for attack but for defense-not
merely to aid parties in assembling their own proof but to protect them from surprise and to
relieve them from taking unnecessary and useless precautions to meet evidence that will
never be offered." Id. at 870 (listing Alabama, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massa-
chusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Ohio, Texas, and Wisconsin).
112. Id.at868.
113. Id.
114. For a more complete historical account of the drafting of the federal discovery
rules, see Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938
Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C.L. REv. 691 (1998).
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tailed pleadings and pleading disputes. ' 5 Edson Sunderland, who
would become the drafter of the federal discovery rules, had also
criticized pleadings as insufficient to reveal the facts that lawyers
needed to prepare cases and advise their clients regarding settle-
ment. "6 With respect to discovery, in 1929 Fleming James of Yale
Law School had recommended eliminating the "own case" rule,
allowing depositions and more expansive document production,
and permitting the trial court to handle overbroad "fishing" at its
discretion."' Robert Millar of Northwestern had also written shortly
before the adoption of the federal rules, comparing numerous sys-
tems of civil procedure and recommending the adoption of oral
depositions."8
Criticism of the pre-FRCP discovery limits included criticism of
the "fishing expedition" metaphor. Sunderland wrote:
False and fictitious causes and defenses thrive under a system
of concealment and secrecy in the preliminary stages of litiga-
tion followed by surprise and confusion at the trial .... All
this is well recognized by the profession, and yet there is a
wide-spread fear of liberalizing discovery. Hostility to 'fishing
expeditions' before trial is a traditional and powerful taboo. "9
Pike and Willis complained in 1938 of the "shibboleth-repeated
to the point of nausea-that the court would not sanction 'fishing
expeditions.- 1" 2 0 George Ragland, a student of Sunderland's, wrote
an influential book promoting the expansion of discovery, with ex-
amples from contemporary state practices. He noted that "the
epithet 'fishing excursion for the adverse party's evidence' has
been employed against the taking of depositions for discovery in
115. CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING passim (1928);
Charles E. Clark &James Wm. Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure I: Pleadings and Parties, 44
YALE L.J. 1291 passim (1935).
116. Sunderland, supra note 44, at 863-65.
117. James, supra note 34, at 773.
118. Millar, supra note 39, at 455.
119. Edson R. Sunderland, Foreword to RAGLAND, supra note 34, at iii.
120. Pike & Willis, supra note 87, at 1436-37. The Biblical use of "shibboleth" is fotnd
in Judges 12:5-8, literally meaning a difference in pronunciation to determine whether one
was a member of the favored tribe. In modern usage, a shibboleth is an arbitrary test to
prove membership in a group. See Answers.com, Shibboleth, http://www.answers.com/
topic/shibboleth (last visited Sept. 18, 2006). It is not unusual for critics to associate the
metaphor with such quasi-religious language. Cf supra text accompanying notes 22-25 (re-
flecting that religious language is used to describe actual fishing).
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every state where it has been attempted.... Judicial opinion, how-
ever, has been opposed to restriction."
2 1
The "fishing expedition" metaphor appears in the Advisory
Committee's discussion of the discovery rules. Committee mem-
bers seemed more concerned about the potential for speculative
litigation than about the "own case" rule. 122 What the Committee
meant by the fishing metaphor, however, is not always clear. Com-
mittee Chairman William De Witt Mitchell warned: "I feel very
strongly... [that we] are going to have an outburst against this dis-
covery business unless we can hedge it about with some appearance
of safety against fishing expeditions." 123 A member of the Advisory
Committee's legal staff told the Fourth Circuit Judicial Conference
that the proposed discovery rules had been amended to
be a protection to defendants against fishing expeditions, in
that an unscrupulous plaintiff cannot file a complaint alleging
any sort of claim which occurs to him, take a deposition of the
defendant, as a result of which he discovers a claim which he
thinks he might sustain, and then amend his complaint assert-
ing the claim.24
On the other hand, Committee member Senator George Wharton
Pepper commented: "Mr. Chairman, I am not worried about the
fishing-expedition aspect of this thing.' 2 5 What is clear, however, is
121. RAGLAND, supra note 34, at 120. Ragland quotes William Howard Taft, when Taft
was an Ohio judge, as opposing this "own case" version of the prohibition on fishing: "There
is no objection that I know, why each party should not know the other's case." Shaw v. Ohio
Edison Installation Co., 9 Ohio Dec. Reprint 809, 812 (Super. Ct. 1887).
122. A number of jurisdictions (including New York) retained the most restrictive ver-
sion of the "own case" rule, which directed that a party could discover information only about
issues on which they had the burden of proof under the pleadings. This requirement tended to
restrict defendants' discovery unless they filed affirmative defenses, while plaintiffs could dis-
cover information supporting their claims. Eliminating the "own case" rule in these
jurisdictions actually helped defendants more than plaintiffs. See RAGLAND, supra note 34, at 32.
123. Subrin, supra note 114, at 722 (citing Proceedings of the Meeting of the Advisory
Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure of the Supreme Court of the United States (Feb.
22, 1935), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE: COMMITTEES ON RULES OF PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURES CI-206-59 (1991) [hereinafter Proceedings of the Advisory
Committee]).
124. Edward H. Hammond, Some Changes in the Preliminary Draft of the Proposed Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 23 A.B.A.J. 629, 631 (1937). Hammond was referring to the provision
that depositions could not normally be taken until after an answer had been filed. Id. He
also mentioned a provision that enabled the court to confine the examination to issues
raised by the pleadings. Id.
125. Proceedings of the Advisory Committee, supra note 123, at CI-209-59-CI-209-60.
Pepper went on to voice a new concern:
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that the Committee did not endorse a blanket condemnation of
"fishing."
5. Reactions to Procedural Reform
a. Fishing Allowed
Whatever the Committee meant, admirers of the new federal
discovery rules had no use for flimsy discovery objections such as "I
object; this is fishing." For this group of the legal elite, fishing was
an acceptable practice. Its members hoped that the rules would
develop a new norm of deciding cases on the merits, not on the
pleadings, and that information exchange would come through
the discovery process. Writing a year after the rules went into ef-
fect, Pike and Willis emphasized (in a section titled "Fishing
Expeditions") that fishing was permissible: "When the new rules
went into effect it was assumed that an end was put to the time-
honored stricture on 'fishing expeditions' imposed by the rule that
a party might not discover facts concerning his opponent's case.' 2"
Similarly, Holtzoff wrote: "That the proceeding may constitute a
'fishing expedition' is not a valid objection to interrogatories. As a
matter of fairness, if there appears to be a reasonable probability
or even possibility that there may be fish in the pond, there is no
reason why the litigant should not be permitted to endeavor to
catch them."
1 27
[I] n the part of the country I come from, I know perfectly well that this sort of power
given to a plaintiff [referring to depositions] is simply going to be used as a means of
ruining the reputation of responsible people. You bring a suit against a man, without
any ground whatever - the president of some important company .... You take his
deposition, have the reporters present, and grill him in the most unfair way, intimat-
ing that he is a burglar or a murderer, or this, that, and the other. He has no redress,
and the next morning the papers have a whole lot of front-page stuff. The case never
goes any further. That is all that was intended.
Id. Chairman Mitchell responded: "It is too much like some of these Senate committees you
used to sit on." Id.
126. James A. Pike &John W. Willis, Federal Discovery in Operation, 7 U. CHI. L. REv. 297,
301 (1939-40).
127. Alexander Holtzoff, Instruments of Discovery Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 41
MICH. L. REv. 205, 215 (1942-43).
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Most of the earliest post-Rule cases embraced broad discovery28
and rejected the "fishing" objection. Judge Moskowitz of the East-
ern District of New York became famous for pointing out that
"[1]imitations which have been placed upon deposition-taking by
state courts, such as the necessity of having the affirmative upon
the issue on which examination is sought, find no basis in the new
Rules. It will not avail a party to raise the familiar cry of 'fishing
expedition. ".29 It seemed for a while that the fishing metaphor was
finally going away.
b. Fishing Still Forbidden
Some areas of concern remained, however, and continued to re-
ceive the pejorative label "fishing expedition." The metaphor often
signaled that plaintiffs needed more evidence before they could
file suit. Some courts rejected general pleading, particularly in
cases tinged with fraud allegations. 30 In Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial
Loan Corporation, a stockholder sued for an accounting of funds,
based on allegations that members of the board of directors had
fraudulently diverted the funds for their personal gain.1' He
claimed that the corporation improperly paid substantial sums of
132
money to an affiliate unsupported by proper documentation.The court dismissed those allegations, announcing:
128. Two weeks after the rules went into effect, a court ruled that the discovery provi-
sions had eliminated many of the old limitations on discovery:
[T]he distinction between discovery of 'evidentiary' facts and 'ultimate or material'
facts is abolished, as is the holding ... that discovery could be obtained only of mat-
ters exclusively... within the knowledge ... of the adverse party ... and further, it is
now established that parties may also be interrogated as to the identity and location
of persons having knowledge of relevant facts.... Under the present rule discovery
may be had now to ascertain facts relating not only to the party's own case but his ad-
versary's also.
Nichols v. Sanborn Co., 24 F. Supp. 908, 910 (D. Mass. 1938).
129. Laverett v. Cont'l Briar Pipe Co., 25 F. Supp. 80, 82 (E.D.N.Y. 1938). See also Glick v.
McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 10 F.R.D. 477, 479 (W.D. Mo. 1950) ("'Fishing expeditions' for
evidentiary facts are permitted under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."); Gutowitz v. Pa.
R.R. Co., 7 F.R.D. 144, 146 (E.D. Pa. 1945) ("'Fishing expeditions' for evidentiary facts are
permitted under the rules."); Pezza v. Williams-Bauer Corp., 3 F.R.D. 355, 355-56 (S.D.N.Y
1942) ("[E]xaminations before trial frequently are permissible 'fishing expeditions' under
the federal practice.").
130. Even under the Federal Rules, allegations of the circumstances constituting fraud
must be plead with particularity. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
131. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 69 F. Supp. 297, 298-300 (D.N.J. 1946).
132. Id.
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The plaintiffs charge that many payments were illegal and
improperly made, without further enlargement, is insufficient
to meet even the bare requirements of the rules of pleading.
The further averment by plaintiff that "an examination of of-
ficers and directors" will disclose which payments were illegal
and ultra vires, stamps this alleged cause of action as one dis-
closing an aspiration rather than a claim upon which recovery
may be had .... "I do not understand that the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure ... will ... permit the plaintiff to call wit-
nesses in a fishing expedition, with the hope that somewhere





Similarly, in a case involving an insolvent bank, the court re-
jected depositors' claims that the Comptroller had paid out
unreasonably large amounts.1 3 4 The court proclaimed: "[T]he alle-
gations of the complaint ... conclude with the revelation that
appellant does not even know the amounts and details of such fees
and expenses. The conclusion is obvious that the preceding allega-
tions upon information are pure guesswork and the suit a fishing
expedition.'
3 5
Discovery cases also provided a home for the fishing metaphor,
which was still used to limit discovery. Sometimes the courts ex-
pressed a generalized feeling that the requested discovery was
unlikely to yield relevant information. One court terminated the
deposition of corporate officers, explaining:
[T]he court has examined the depositions so far as taken.
The transcript contains about 1,000 pages. His examination
progressed from interest to boredom, and thence to a certain
amount of shock.... Granting that Rule No. 26 has a ten-
dency somewhat to encourage fishing expeditions, still the
fishing is subject to some license and limit, and should not be
continued day after day when the catch is composed of min-
136
nows.
133. Id. at 301 (quoting the "fishing" language from Mebco Realty Holding Co. v. War-
ner Bros. Pictures, 44 F. Supp. 591, 592 (D.N.J. 1942)). Mebco was an antitrust case involving
movie theaters, in which one defendant had loaned money to construct a new, competing
theater. Mebco, 44 F. Supp. at 592. The court expressed considerable skepticism about the
plaintiff's claim and granted summary judgment to the defendants. Id.
134. Lucking v. Delano, 122 F.2d 21, 26 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (dismissing class action).
135. Id. at 26. See also United States ex tel. Schiff v. Atlantic Basin Iron Works, 53 F. Supp.
268, 271 (E.D.N.Y. 1943) (granting motion for bill of particulars).
136. Heiner v. N. Am. Coal Corp., 3 F.R.D. 64,65 (W.D. Pa. 1942).
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Other courts used "fishing" to criticize the language of docu-
ment production requests. One much-cited case denied a motion
to produce documents, determining that the words "any and all"
did not sufficiently describe the documents sought. 3 The court
justified its decision, reasoning: "Undoubtedly the rules are to be
liberally construed (Rule 1), but it was never intended by these
Rules to revolutionize the practice by allowing fishing excur-
sions. " '3
Courts also used the fishing metaphor to distinguish the amount
of probing allowed by the various discovery devices. In the most
common version, depositions and interrogatories could be used to
fish, 9 but requests for document production could not.40 Some
courts thus rejected production requests as insufficiently specific in
designating the desired documents. Welty v. Clute, for example, re-
quired the discovering party to take depositions first to identify the
documents that existed, and only then to request the documents
themselves.14 ' The court contended: "[T]he motion seems to par-
take much of the nature of a 'fishing expedition.' This was not the
intent of [Rule 34] .,,14'2 A few years later, another court maintained
that "[f]rom Rule 34 ... there has evolved the frequent repeated
legal holding that roving and fishing expeditions into an adver-
sary's files will not be permitted."4 3 Holtzoff, although he approved
of fishing with depositions and interrogatories, also thought that
document requests should be more limited and only employed to
obtain material evidence. He asserted: "A roving inspection or a
137. Thomas French & Sons v. Carleton Venetian Blind Co., 30 F. Supp. 903, 905
(E.D.N.Y. 1939). See also Fort Wayne Corrugated Paper Co. v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 4
F.R.D. 328, 330 (W.D. Pa. 1940) ("[T]he use of the word 'all' in connection with these min-
utes and this correspondence would seem to indicate that the plaintiff is engaged in a
fishing excursion rather than the production of specified documents.").
138. Thomas Frnch & Sons, 30 F. Supp. at 905.
139. Byers Theaters, Inc. v. Murphy, 1 F.R.D. 286, 288 (W.D. Va. 1940) ("A general ob-
jection, that the interrogatories constitute a 'fishing expedition', is of no avail."). But see The
J.L. Jr., 64 F. Supp. 185, 185-86 (E.D.N.Y. 1945) (acknowledging that the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure had not broadened the scope of interrogatories, and thus they could not be
used to "pry into [the] adversary's case").
140. This belief is not surprising: at that time document production still required a mo-
tion and showing of good cause, and old equity cases had placed particular limits on
document production. See BRAY, supra note 40, at 151 (noting that equity courts were less
inclined to order documents produced than interrogatories answered).
141. Welty v. Clute, 29 F. Supp. 2,2 (W.D.N.Y. 1939).
142. Id. at 2.
143. H-P-M Dev. Corp. v. Watson-Stillman Co., 71 F. Supp. 906, 914 (D.N.J. 1947). Inter-
estingly, the court cited no cases to demonstrate the "frequent repeated legal holding." Id.
See also Archer v. Comillaud, 41 F. Supp. 435, 436 (W.D. Ky. 1941) (holding that plaintiff
must request particular books and records and also state facts showing that the information
is relevant to the case).
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dragnet, or a fishing excursion is not permitted under Rule 34. ',144
Other courts disagreed, declaring that fishing was appropriate for
document production. An often quoted case, Golden Arcadia Mu-
tual Casualty Co., rejected the defendant's "fishing" argument,
stating that the discovery rules, including Rule 34, "permit 'fishing'
for evidence, as they should. If documents in defendant's posses-
sion tend to sustain plaintiffs claim, plaintiff is entitled to inspect
them and have the use of them as evidence.' 45 The fishing meta-
phor, then, did not disappear completely even in the early FRCP
years.
c. Fishing for Trial Preparation Materials
The greatest split of authority occurred over trial preparation
materials. 146 The authorities debated whether parties could fish for
copies of statements taken by an opponent in preparation for trial.
Under the old equity practice, this issue did not tend to arise. The
"own case" rule, the notion that one could discover "facts" but not
"evidence," and the requirement that documents be admissible in
order to be discoverable prohibited discovery of such informa-
tion.' 47 Under the new discovery rules, however, such information
was potentially discoverable (unless protected under the rubric of
"privilege") because it was relevant and the "own case" rule had
disappeared.
This issue reached its climax in the Supreme Court's opinion in
Hickman v. Taylor, which, not surprisingly, included references to
"fishing." 148 The Third Circuit, in creating a new protection of the
"work product of the lawyer," rejected arguments that would have
returned to pre-Rule sensibilities: "As we approach the question we
must discard some favorite craft notions of the advocate.... We
must.., discard the notion that questions from the other side can
144. Holtzoff, supra note 127, at 219.
145. Golden Arcadia Mut. Cas. Co., 3 F.R.D. 26, 26 (N.D. Ill. 1942). See also Olson
Transp. Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 7 F.R.D. 134, 136 (D. Wis. 1944).
146. Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure, Report of Proposed Amend-
ments (June, 1946), 5 F.R.D. 433, 457-60 (citing cases); Hickman v. Taylor, 153 F.2d 212, 217
n.6 (3d Cir. 1945) (citing cases), affd, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); Holtzoff, supra note 127, at 211-
12 (citing cases); Pike & Willis, supra note 126, at 303-07 (citing cases).
147. Together, these doctrines prevented discovery of the trial preparation materials
now protected by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. FED. R. Civ. P 26(b) (3). Work prod-
uct was previously protected by the 'own case' and admissibility rules because much of it was
information that supported the opponent's case or 'mere evidence,' and many documents
would have been inadmissible due to the rule against hearsay.
148. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
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be fended off on the ground that the opponent's lawyer is simply
engaged in a fishing expedition."49
Justice Murphy's majority opinion for the Supreme Court con-
tains what is undoubtedly the best-known example of the
metaphor. He noted the splits in the case law, discussed the roles of
pleading and discovery under the new rules, and affirmed the im-
portance of disclosure:
We agree, of course, that the deposition-discovery rules are to
be accorded a broad and liberal treatment. No longer can the
time-honored cry of "fishing expedition" serve to preclude a
party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent's case.
Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both
parties is essential to proper litigation.5 °
In dismissing the "time honored cry," Justice Murphy cited Pike
and Willis's article about discovery which, as noted earlier, identi-
fied the "fishing expedition" objection with the "own case" rule.'
He also borrowed language from Judge Moskowitz's 1938 opinion,
which also referred to the "own case" rule .' The Court was, in ef-
fect, overruling its former decision in Carpenter v. Winn, which had
embodied the "own case" limit on discovery.13 What was the Su-
preme Court rejecting as an objection to discovery? In the context
of Hickman itself, the issue was not a claim that the suit itself was
speculative, or that the interrogatories were too generally worded.
It was, rather, an attempt to discover the basis of an opponent's
case, as the statements in question were taken from tug company
employees by the tug company's lawyer.'" Thus, this much-quoted
endorsement of liberal discovery may have had a narrower mean-
ing than previously thought.
155
149. Hickman v. Taylor, 153 F.2d 212, 216-17, 223 (3d Cir. 1945).
150. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 507 (emphasis added).
151. Id. at 5087 n.8 (citing Pike & Willis, supra note 126, at 303).
152. Laverett v. Cont'l Briar Pipe Co., 25 F. Supp. 80, 82 (E.D.N.Y. 1938) ("It will not
avail a party to raise the familiar cry of 'fishing expedition.'"). See supra text accompanying
note 129.
153. Carpenter v. Winn, 221 U.S. 533, 540 (1911).
154. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 498.
155. Even if Hickman referred only to the "own case" rule, however, it is clear that the
drafters of the federal rules intended to permit "fishing," in the sense of deemphasizing
pleadings and using discovery to gather information about a case. See, e.g., Charles E. Clark,
Experience Under the Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 8 F.R.D. 497, 502 (1948)
(noting that the 1946 discovery rule revisions allowed discovery of information "reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence" in order to clarify that the Rules
intended to eliminate complaints about fishing) (quoting FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(3)); Charles
E. Clark, The Influence of Federal Procedural Reform, 13 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 144, 157
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d. The Federal Courts React to Hickman
Whatever Justice Murphy's intent, federal courts after Hickman
latched onto his language, and a number of courts quickly noted
the propriety of fishing expeditions. Courts cited the Hickman lan-
guage to show that: the scope of discovery was measured by
"subject matter" rather than pleadings;1 6 a party had demonstrated
good cause for production of documents;1" a party must provide
factual answers, even if the information came through his attor-
neys;' a party need not depose witnesses before requesting
production of documents; 59 a party may discover information
within its own knowledge;" and a party's designation of docu-
ments was sufficiently specific.' 6' In short, federal courts used
Hickman's rejection of the "fishing expedition" to support decisions
that ended the old equitable bill of discovery limitations and to
endorse the policy of mutual sharing of relevant information.
e. State Courts Remain Largely Hostile to Fishing
Meanwhile, state court discovery reform had only just begun,
and so the "fishing expedition" metaphor still reinforced tradi-
tional limits on pleading and discovery. Judges employed a
prohibition on fishing to limit the discovering party to information
about its own case, 162 refuse discovery that would identify additional
parties, 6 3 and conclude that a request for documents did not plead
(1948) (noting that by repudiating the objection to "fishing expeditions," courts allow dis-
covery by all litigants of all features of a case).
156. Chem. Specialties Co. v. CIBA Pharm. Prods., Inc., 10 F.R.D. 500, 501-02 (D.N.J.
1950); Dusha v. Pa. R.R., 10 F.R.D. 150, 151-52 (N.D. Ohio 1950).
157. Paramount Film Dist. Corp. v. RAM, 91 F. Supp. 778, 780 (E.D.S.C. 1950); Lindsay
v. Prince, 8 F.R.D. 233, 235 (N.D. Ohio 1948); Michel v. Meier, 8 F.R.D. 464, 476 (W.D. Pa.
1948); Hirshhorn v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 8 F.R.D. 11, 21 (W.D. Pa. 1948). But see
Dulansky v. Iowa-Ill. Gas & Elec. Co., 10 F.R.D. 146, 150 (S.D. Iowa 1950) (holding that some
document requests were insufficiently specific).
158. O'Donnell v. Breuninger, 9 F.R.D. 245, 246-47 (D.D.C. 1949) (holding, in an
alienation of affections case, that plaintiff husband was required to answer a question about
his knowledge of his wife and defendant sharing a hotel room).
159. Hawaiian Airlines v. Trans-Pacific Airlines, 8 F.R.D. 449, 450-51 (D. Haw. 1948);
Lindsay v. Prince, 8 F.R.D. 233, 235 (N.D. Ohio 1948).
160. Brown v. Dunbar & Sullivan Dredging Co., 8 F.R.D. 107, 108 (W.D.N.Y 1948).
161. Henz v. United States, 9 F.R.D. 291, 295 (N.D. Cal. 1949).
162. See, e.g., Chandler v. Taylor, 12 N.W.2d 590, 595 (Iowa 1944); State ex M1 Laughlin v.
Sartorius, 119 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938); Tremblay v. Lyon, 29 N.Y.S.2d 336, 340-
41 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
163. Monroe v. Superior Court, 218 P.2d 136, 138 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950) (holding that
wife could not compel husband to divulge names of adultery "accomplices"); Rost v. Kessler,
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sufficient facts to demonstrate that the documents contained ma-
terial evidence.'" The fishing metaphor was common in election
contests, 16 business owners' requests to inspect books and re-
cords, 166 attempts by creditors to find assets, 6 and requests to
question jurors about misconduct.'
The Alabama case of Ex parte Brooks illustrates the gap between
discovery theory in the state courts then and now.'69 Alabama law at
the time allowed deposition of women before trial to spare them
the embarrassment of appearing in court. The issue in Brooks was
whether this law could be used to force a female litigant to give
pre-trial deposition testimony in place of the normal interrogatory
replies. The court said no:
Can we imagine that the legislature meant to authorize the
practice of allowing a woman to be harassed with experimen-
tal fishing expeditions in anticipation of the trial, and to make
the statute an instrument of annoyance to her or even of op-
pression when such right does not exist when [the] opposing
party sought to be examined is a man?' 
7
As states began to amend their pleading and discovery rules to
mirror the federal rules, commentators on those changes noted
that the "fishing" objection was no longer valid. An Arizona lawyer,
urging a modern mindset to match the modern rules, commented
that the scope of depositions was "practically unlimited and the old
cry of 'fishing expedition' is no longer a valid objection-fishing
expeditions are encouraged for they tend to bring out the facts.' 7
The Chair of Alabama's Commission for Judicial Reform in 1957
described the problems posed by the old rules:
39 N.Y.S.2d 863, 865 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (holding that plaintiff could not examine defendant
regarding whether he was acting in scope of employment at time of accident).
164. Marietta Mfg. Co. v. Hedges-Walsh-Weidner Co., 2 A.2d 922, 927 (Del. Super. Ct.
1938); E. States Corp. v. Eisler, 30 A.2d 867, 869 (Md. 1943).
165. People ex rel. Harper v. City of Pueblo, 126 P.2d 339, 341 (Colo. 1942); Landry v.
Ozenne, 195 So. 14, 19, 22 (La. 1940).
166. Dandini v. Superior Court, 100 P.2d 535, 537 (Cal. Ct. App. 1940) (director); News-
Journal Corp. v. State ex rel. Gore, 187 So. 271, 272 (Fla. 1939) (shareholder); Chandler v.
Taylor, 12 N.W.2d 590, 595 (Iowa 1944) (partner); E. States Corp. v. Eisler, 30 A.2d 867, 869
(Md. App. 1943) (shareholder).
167. State ex rel Bostelmann v. Aronson, 235 S.W.2d 384, 388 (Mo. 1950); Biltrite Bldg.
Co. v. Adams, 7 S.E.2d 857, 859 (S.C. 1940).
168. Christensen v. Boucher, 24 N.W.2d 782, 790 (Iowa 1946); Thompson v. Ry. Express
Agency, 206 S.W.2d 134, 136 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
169. Exparte Brooks, 32 So. 2d 534 (Ala. 1947).
170. Id. at 536.
171. Lyle Roger Allen, The New Rules in Arizana, 16F.R.D. 183,189 (1954).
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Any effort by interrogatories, or otherwise, to obtain a clear
picture of the factual situation in any case was met with the
ancient hue and cry of 'fishing expedition' with the result that
each party and the court were required to enter upon the trial




Given the early enthusiasm for notice pleading and broader dis-
covery, and for less technicality in both, the "fishing expedition"
metaphor was for a time on the decline, or applied only to issues
on the margins. 73 As Professor Marcus has so ably demonstrated,
however, by the 1970s there was a shift in the other direction in
both pleading particularity and scope of discovery.' 74 For example,
a legal commission appointed by then-ChiefJustice Warren Burger
claimed: "Wild fishing expeditions ... seem to be the norm."7"
Along with this change, negative invocations of the "fishing expedi-
tion" metaphor reappeared. Courts still cite Hickman as supporting
liberal discovery, but they often immediately follow it with a quali-
fier that prohibits fishing.
76
In terms of subject matter, a large cluster of the state
cases using the fishing metaphor involve personal injury
claims, 7   shareholder disputes,78  disputes with insurance
172. Thomas E. Skinner, Alabama's Approach to a Modern System of Pleading and Practice, 20
F.R.D. 119,129-30 (1957).
173. For a discussion of federal cases in the period immediately following the adoption
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see supra text accompanying notes 128-147.
174. See Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. Rv. 747, 752 (1998);
Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86
COLUM. L. REv. 433, 444-45 (1986).
175. William H. Erickson, The Pound Conference Recommendations: A Blueprint for the Justice
System in the 7wenty-First Century, 76 F.R.D. 277, 288 (1978).
176. See, e.g., AmeristarJet Charter, Inc. v. Signal Composites, Inc., 244 F.3d 189, 192-93
(1st Cir. 2001); Martinez v. Cornell Corr. of Tex., 229 F.R.D. 215, 218 (D.N.M. 2005).
177. See, e.g., Rehm v. Pence, No. G028059, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 11699, at
*18-19 (Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2002); Kaplan v. Allen, 837 So. 2d 1174, 1176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2003); McPherson v. Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org., Inc., 813 So. 2d 1032, 1034 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2002); Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Camara de Comercio Latino-Americana de Los
Estados Unidos, Inc., 813 So. 2d 250, 252 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); Vermette v. Bridges, No.
CV-99-187, 2000 Me. Super. LEXIS 2, at *6 (Super. Ct. Jan. 4, 2000); Hiller v. Volkman, No.
CX-00-2035, 2001 Minn. App. LEXIS 796, at *7 (Ct. App. July 17, 2001); Price v. County of
Suffolk, 756 N.Y.S.2d 758, 759 (App. Div. 2003); Jerome v. A-Best Prods. Co., Nos. 79139,
79141, 79142, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 1879, at *21 (Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2002); In re Whiteley,
79 S.W.3d 729, 735 (Tex. App. 2002); In reCSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149, 153 (Tex. 2003).
178. See, e.g., Cal. Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys. v. Coulter, No. 19191-NC, 2004 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 64, at *3 (Ch. May 26, 2004); Oliver v. Boston Univ., No. 16570-NC, 2004 Del. Ch.
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companies,'79 and employment discrimination claims. 180 State cases
use the "fishing expedition" metaphor to criticize discovery re-
quests that the court believes to be broader than the allegations in
the complaint." The metaphor also appears when a court over-
rules a request seeking more time for discovery that is filed in
opposition to a motion for summary judgment. 82 Occasionally,
courts use the metaphor to distinguish the allowable breadth of
discovery under different devices.
18 3
Federal fishing metaphors also occur more frequently in certain
types of cases. Actions governed by the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act (PSLRA) are common, particularly since the legislative
history of that Act claims that securities fraud actions often "re-
semble [] a fishing expedition. '8 4 Some of these cases challenge the
sufficiency of the pleadings, while others consider a request to lift
the Act's discovery stay.185 Cases alleging employment discrimina-
tion are also home to cries of "fishing expedition."8 6 Cases
LEXIS 51, at *10 (Ch. Apr. 26, 2004); In re Fuqua Indus. Inc. Shareholder Litig., No. 11974,
2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 52, at *18-19 (Ch. May 2, 2002); In re Best Lock Corp. Shareholder
Litig., No. 16281, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 175, at *15 (Ch. Dec. 18, 2000); Marsalis v. Wilson,
778 N.E.2d 612, 618 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002); Wolfington v. Wolfington Body Co., 47 Pa. D. &
C.4th 225, 242 (Ct. C.P. 2000); In re Ernst & Young, No. 05-02-00352-CV, 2002 Tex. App.
LEXIS 2986, at *3 (App. Apr. 30, 2002).
179. See, e.g., Ramon v. Aries Ins. Co., 769 So. 2d 1053, 1055 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000);
Reusswig v. Erie Ins., 49 Pa. D. & C.4th 338, 346 (Ct. C.P. 2000); In re United Serv. Auto.
Ass'n, 76 S.W.3d 112,116 (Tex. App. 2002).
180. See, e.g., Everts v. Salvation Army Harbor Light Multi-Services Ctr., No. C8-02-1728,
2003 Minn. App. LEXIS 696, at *17-18 (Ct. App. June 10, 2003); Samide v. Roman Catholic
Diocese, 773 N.Y.S.2d 116, 118 (App. Div. 2004).
181. See, e.g., Vanvorous v. Burmeister, 687 N.W.2d 132, 139 (Mich. App. 2004); In re
United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 76 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. App. 2002); Saratoga Harness Racing,
Inc. v. Roemer, 711 N.Y.S.2d 603, 605 (App. Div. 2000); Texaco, Inc. v. Sanderson, 898
S.W.2d 813,815 (Tex. 1995).
182. See, e.g., Vanvorous, 687 N.W.2d at 139; Rowlette & Assoc. v. Calphalon Corp., No.
C8-99-1667, 2000 Minn. App. LEXIS 364, at *28 (Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2000).
183. See, e.g., Biloffv. Biloff, No. A-99-033, 2000 Neb. App. LEXIS 185, at *17 (App.June
20, 2000) (allowing fishing with interrogatories and depositions but not with document
production requests); Loftin v. Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Tex. 1989) (also allowing fish-
ing with interrogatories and depositions but not with document production requests). But
see K-Mart Corp. v. Sanderson, 937 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Tex. 1996) (rejecting "the notion that
any discovery device can be used to 'fish").
184. See, e.g., In re Carnegie Int'l Corp. Sec. Litig., 107 F. Supp. 2d 676, 679 (D. Md.
2000) (citing S. REP. No. 104-98, at 14 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683).
185. See In re AOL Time Warner, Inc. Sec. & ERISA Litig., No. MDL-1500, 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2731, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2003); In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA
Litig., No. MDL-1446, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26261, at *30 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2002); Fazio v.
Lehman Bros., Inc., No. 1:02CV157, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15157, at *1-2 (N.D. Ohio May
16, 2002); In re Worldcom, Inc. Sec. Master File Litig., 234 F. Supp. 2d 301, 301-02 (S.D.N.Y
2002); In re Campbell Soup Co. Sec. Litig., 145 F Supp. 2d 574, 595 (D.N.J. 2001).
186. See, e.g., Torres v. White, No. 00-4146, 46 F. App'x 738, 750 (6th Cir. 2002) (na-
tional origin discrimination); Grayson v. O'Neill, 308 E3d 808, 817 (7th Cir. 2002) (race
discrimination); Munoz v. St. Mary-Corwin Hosp., 221 E3d 1160, 1169 (10th Cir. 2000) (age
[VOL.40:1
FALL 2006] just Say "No Fishing"
challenging the factual specificity of antitrust allegations produce a
number of "fishing" objections,"7 as do discovery requests in intel-
lectual property cases.""'
In terms of procedural posture, fishing metaphors appear most
often in motions demanding more detail in pleadings,' disputes
about discovery,'9° and cases involving Rule 56(f) motions to allow
more discovery before ruling on a motion for summary judg-
ment.'9 ' In addition, plaintiffs seeking to discover forum contacts
and national origin discrimination); Treat v. Garrett County Memn. Hosp., No. AMD 03-1937,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25869, at *15 (D. Md. Dec. 23, 2004) (gender and sexual. orientation
discrimination); Cooper v. John D. Brush & Co., 242 F. Supp. 2d 261, 266 (W.D.N.Y. 2003)
(race discrimination); Adams v. Giant Foods, Inc., 225 F. Supp. 2d 600, 607 (D. Md. 2002)
(race discrimination); Boyd v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 3-01-CV-2230-D, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19937, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 17, 2002) (race discrimination); Pedraza v. Holiday House-
wares, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 40, 42 (D. Mass. 2001) (national origin and sexual orientation
discrimination); Hill v. Motel 6, 205 F.R.D. 490, 493 n.2 (S.D. Ohio 2001) (age discrimina-
tion); Garcia-Vazquez v. Frito Lay Snacks Caribbean, Inc., No. 97-1313(SEC), 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1699, at *5, 8 (D.P.R. Feb. 16, 2001) (hostile work environment).
187. See, e.g., DM Research, Inc. v. Coll. of Am. Pathologists, 170 F.3d 53, 55 (1st Cir.
1999); Network Computing Servs v. Cisco Sys., 223 F.R.D. 392, 395 (D.S.C. 2004); Fare Deals,
Ltd. v. Glorioso, 217 F. Supp. 2d 670, 671 (D. Md. 2002); DJ Mfg. Corp. v. Tex-Shield, Inc.,
275 F. Supp. 2d 109, 120 (D.P.R. 2002); In m IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., 77
F.R.D. 39, 42 (N.D. Cal. 1977). RICO cases, also disfavored, find similar uses for the fishing
metaphor when requiring heightened pleading specificity. See, e.g., Jepson, Inc. v. Makita
Corp., 34 F3d 1321, 1327 (7th Cir. 1994).
188. See, e.g., Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard Register Co., 229 F.3d 1091, 1116 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (patent infringement); Transclean Corp. v. MotorVac Tech., Inc., No. 01-287
(JRT/FLN), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19312, at *7 (D. Minn. Sep. 30, 2002) (patent infringe-
ment); Ronald A. Katz Tech. Licensing, L.P. v. Verizon Commc'n., Inc., No. 01-5627, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19691, at *4, 8 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 2002) (patent infringement); Spring
Windows Fashions LP v. Novo Indus., 249 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1113 (W.D. Wis. 2002) (patent
infringement); Automated Tech., Inc. v. Eller, 160 F. Supp. 2d 915, 926 (N.D. IlI. 2001)
(theft of trade secrets).
189. See, e.g., DM Research, Inc. v. Coll. of Am. Pathologists, 170 F.3d 53, 55 (1st Cir.
1999); Duggan v. Terzakis, 275 F. Supp. 2d 968, 973 (N.D. II. 2003); DJ Mfg. Corp. v. Tex-
Shield, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 109, 120 (D.P.R. 2002).
190. See, e.g., Higgason v. Hanks, 54 F. App'x 448, 450 (7th Cir. 2002); McGee v. Hayes,
43 F. App'x 214, 217 (10th Cir. 2002); Ignatiev v. United States, 238 F.3d 464, 466-67 (D.C.
Cir. 2001); Monarch Assurance P.L.C. v. United States, 244 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001);
Abram v. Cargill, No. 01-CV-1656 (JMR/FLN), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7027, at *7, 8 (D.
Minn. Feb. 10, 2003); Bowen v. Parking Auth. of Camden, 214 F.R.D. 188, 195 (D.N.J. 2003);
One Thousand Friends of Iowa v. Mineta, 250 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1079 (S.D. Iowa 2002); Gar-
cel, Inc. v. Hibernia Nat'l Bank, No. 01-0772, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2390, at *8 (E.D. La. Jan.
24, 2002); Catskill Dev., L.L.C. v. Park Place Entm't Corp., 206 F.R.D. 78, 93 (S.D.N.Y. 2002);
McGrath v. Nassau Health Care Corp., 209 F.R.D. 55, 61 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); Boyd v. Am. Air-
lines, Inc., No. 3-01-CV-2230-D, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19937, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 17, 2002);
Automated Techs., Inc. v. Eller, 160 F. Supp. 2d 915, 926 (N.D. IlI. 2001); Hill v. Motel 6, 205
F.R.D. 490, 493 n.2 (S.D. Ohio 2001); Livingston v. Assoc. Fin. Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12047, at *17 (S.D. Ill.June 25, 2001); Pedraza v. Holiday Housewares, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 40, 42
(D. Mass. 2001); Orleman v.Jumpking Inc., No. 99-2522-CM, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11081,
at *6 (D. Kan.July 22, 2000).
191. See, e.g., Grayson v. O'Neill, 308 F.3d 808, 817 (7th Cir. 2002); Moore U.S.A. v.
Standard Register Co., 229 F.3d 1091, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Dunkin' Donuts Inc. v. N.A.S.T.,
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that might establish personal jurisdiction over defendants, espe-
cially foreign nationals, are periodically accused of "fishing."192 In
virtually all of the federal cases, the court might or might not find a
party to be fishing, but fishing is clearly prohibited.
Occasionally a contemporary judge bucks the trend and recog-
nizes a limited but legitimate role for fishing. Judge Scheindlin, for
example, discussed at length the reasons for requiring fraud to be
pled with particularity.9 3 Nevertheless she went on to note:
So-called 'fishing expeditions' may not be all bad, however.
For one thing, the threat of being sued, even if the plaintiff is
still digging for facts, may serve to deter fraud. Moreover, the
balance of harms may tip in favor of a fishing expedition
rather than an undiscovered fraud. This may be so, even
though the victim of a fishing expedition who has not commit-
ted any harm is forced to serve as the unwilling fish.
194
Judges also signal acceptance of fishing in discovery: "In short, fish-
ing expeditions are permissible, and the discovery statutes must be
liberally construed."
195
The pleading and discovery scheme of the Federal Rules also
provides at least a limited "fishing license." Rule 11 (b) (3), govern-
Inc., No. 02 C 1272, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6179, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 9, 2003); Cooper v.
John D. Brush & Co., 242 F Supp. 2d 261, 266 (W.D.N.Y. 2003); Fare Deals, Ltd. v. Glorioso,
217 F. Supp. 2d 670, 671 (D. Md. 2002); Butler Corp. v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., No.
00-30003-MAP, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25012, at *13-14 (D. Mass. Dec. 27, 2002); Spring
Windows Fashions LP v. Novo Indus., 249 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1113 (W.D. Wis. 2002).
192. See, e.g., Carefirst of Maryland, Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334 E3d 390,
403 (4th Cir. 2003); Base Metal Trading, Ltd. v. OJSC "Novokuznetsky Aluminum Factory",
283 F.3d 208, 216 (4th Cir. 2002); Metro.Antiques & Gems, Inc. v. Beaumont, No. 02 CIV.
3937 (DLC), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24679, at *12-13 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2002); In reSki Train
Fire, 230 F. Supp. 2d 392, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); In reVitamins Antitrust Litig., 120 F. Supp. 2d
45, 50,54, 56 (D.D.C. 2000).
193. In 7e Initial Public Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 281, 324-26 (S.D.N.Y 2003).
194. Id. at 326 n.46.
195. FSR Brokerage, Inc. v. Super. Ct., No. B156982, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 94,
at *11 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2002). See also Ill. Coalition Against Handgun Violence v. Ill.
Council Against Handgun Violence, No. 02 C 4130, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3945, at *5 (N.D.
Ill. March 18, 2003) ("1 allowed the Coalition to go on a brief fishing expedition."); United
States v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., No. 99-5 MMS, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6925, at *13-14 (D. Del.
May 10, 2000) ("Liberal discovery is particularly appropriate in a government antitrust suit
because of the important public interest involved."); Garamendi v. Golden Eagle Ins. Co., 10
Cal. Rptr. 3d 724, 741 n.8 (Ct. App. 2004) ("([Ciontrary to popular belief), fishing expedi-
tions are permissible in some cases.") (internal citation omitted). Accord, 8A CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2206 (1994) ("[A]n objection
that a request for inspection is a fishing expedition should be given short shrift. It is true
that the party seeking discovery must still designate what it wishes to inspect, but all this
obstacle means is that the would-be angler must have a general idea of what kind of fish he
or she is hoping to catch.").
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ing good faith in pleadings, specifically allows plaintiffs to make
claims that "if specifically so identified, are likely to have eviden-
tiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery. ' ' Assuming that plaintiffs are willing to
self-identify claims as currently lacking support, this rule surely al-
lows plaintiffs to use discovery to fish for information that will
support their contentions.
9 7
Despite such occasional relief from the metaphor, the prohibi-
tion of fishing expeditions is very much alive. Its original
meaning-limiting discovery to facts supporting one's own case-is
dead, but limits on discovery of an opponent's trial preparation
materials survive to some extent in the work product exemption."
The types of discovery once rejected as "fishing" are accepted
without controversy under even the narrowest current concepts of
discovery. Pleadings once dismissed for "fishing" would satisfy
modern notice pleading requirements. The concept remains, but
the line has moved.
The primary function of the fishing metaphor is to express dis-
approval of a party who is thought to have insufficient information
to bring, or continue with, a lawsuit. The "fishing expedition"
metaphor now inhabits the center of a crucial policy decision
about civil litigation: where courts will draw the line between recti-
fying informational imbalance and protecting defendants from
non-meritorious lawsuits. The condemnation of fishing has
morphed from a means of protecting a party's privacy and property
rights' 9t to an argument about protecting parties from the costs of
196. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3). See alsoThomas D. Rowe,Jr., A Square Peg in a Round Hole?
The 2000 Limitation on the Scope of Federal Civil Discovery, 69 TENN. L. REv. 13, 21-22 (2001)
("The rule's apparent tolerance of claims that plaintiffs identify as likely to have support
after discovery seems to me to be-along with generally broad notice pleading under the
Federal Rules, plus American reliance on private litigation for much enforcement of our
public-law norms-part of the round hole into which the square peg of scope narrowing
does not fit.").
197. See Hous. Rights Ctr. v. Sterling, No. CV 03-859 DSF (Ex), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
28877, at *14 n.6 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2004) (citing FED. R. Civ. P. Il(b)(3) in overruling ob-
jection to discovery). But see Ferluga v. Eickhoff, No. 05-2338-JWL, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
40915, at *16-17 (D. Kan. June 19, 2006) (ruling that merely alleging plaintiff might dis-
cover evidentiary support is inadequate to justify discovery).
198. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (3) (codifying work product exemption, which precludes dis-
covery of an opponent's trial materials, including material that supports the opponent's
case).
199. Some "fishing expedition" cases still do concern privacy or property rights. See, e.g.,
Automated Tech., Inc. v. Eller, 160 F. Supp. 2d 915, 926 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (protecting trade
secrets); Garcia-Vazquez v. Frito Lay Snacks Caribbean, Inc., Civil No. 97-1313(SEC), 2001
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1699 (D.P.R. Feb. 16, 2001) (protecting certain of plaintiffs psychiatric
records).
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litigation. In an overwhelming majority of cases, the fishing meta-
phor is used on behalf of defendants to limit claims by plaintiffs.
II. "FISHING EXPEDITION" As STRATEGY:
THE IMPACT OF METAPHOR
The pervasive use of the fishing metaphor affects more than in-
dividual cases. It creates an environment in which litigants and
courts treat certain kinds of claims and certain procedural devices
as suspect. Defendants who demand particularity in pleading or
resist discovery sometimes muddy the waters with accusations of
"fishing," which can distract the courts from the parties' proper
burdens. Courts also use the fishing metaphor as a rhetorical flour-
ish in cases that were destined to lose anyway, either because of
horrible facts, inept lawyering, or an information gap the court
refuses to fill. The metaphor is unlikely to change the result in very
weak cases, but its association with dubious litigation adds a rotten
smell to any metaphorical fishing expedition. In that way, when-
ever litigants or courts use the metaphor it insinuates that the
"fisher" is acting improperly or ineptly. When the metaphor at-
taches to an entire line of cases, it spawns and reinforces a
presumption of impropriety, forcing plaintiffs in all of the disfa-
vored cases to swim upstream. This section examines the way these
metaphorical strategies combine to bias the legal system as a whole,
whether individual decisions containing the fishing metaphor
reach correct or erroneous conclusions.
A. "Fishing" as a Verbal Attack
Litigants opposing litigation or discovery have consistently used
the metaphor as a verbal weapon. This tradition goes back to the
earliest days of the legal metaphor, as when a defendant in 1797
was already arguing that "this is one of those vexatious fishing
bills.""2° Instead of just addressing the merits of the discovery dis-
pute (e.g., the discovery request is overbroad, compliance would
be burdensome, the requested information is not relevant), the
opponent calls it a "fishing expedition." In some cases, one can
almost hear the sneer in the tone of the argument:
200. Renison v. Ashley, (1794) 30 Eng. Rep. 724, 725 (Ch.) ("This is another of the fish-
ing bills, that I do not like to see in this Court.") (emphasis added).
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* "If a party, at the instance of his adversary, can be
compelled to give his deposition ... such a method
of preparing for the trial would be tantamount to a
fishing excursion for evidence to support a doubtful
cause."2°1
* "This does not even rise to the dignity of a fishing
bill."
202
" "[D]espite a massive fishing expedition regarding
[defendant's] alleged 'patterns and practices' con-
cerning the sale of credit life insurance policies,
[plaintiff] ultimately failed to disclose any pattern
or practice witnesses.,
20 3
"Plaintiff is attempting to engage in an expensive
fishing expedition under the guise of further dis-
covery, as Plaintiff has failed to state what facts
beyond mere speculation that she intends to dis-
,,204
cover.
* "The plaintiffs Nike and adidas ... have extended
their deep-pocketed tentacles on a fishing expedi-
tion in hope of catching violators."
2 0 5
0 "[P] laintiffs are 'attempting ... to use discovery as a
fishing expedition ... in the desperate hope of
finding something to justify their unfounded
claim.'"
Sometimes courts are well aware of the almost-scripted nature of
these barbs, noting the "familiar designation of professedly indignant
respondents, 'a fishing expedition' ,206 or referring to the metaphor
as "hackneyed and meaningless."207 Nor does the name-calling always
work.08 In such cases the metaphor may have served only as a
201. Wheeler v. Burckhardt, 56 P. 644, 645 (Or. 1899) (defendant opposing discovery
depositions).
202. Smith v. Ramsey, 6 Ill. 373, 376 (1844) (defendant objecting to bill of discovery).
203. Bostic v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 87 F. Supp. 2d 611, 613 (S.D.W. Va. 2000) (defendant
opposing plaintiff's fee request).
204. Madrid v. Chronicle Books, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1236 (D. Wyo. 2002) (defendant
opposing discovery).
205. Nike, Inc. v. Top Brand Ca., 216 F.R.D. 259, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (defendant oppos-
ing sanctions).
206. In re Kevill, 2 N.Y.S.2d 191, 194 (Surrogate Ct. 1938). See also McClatchy Newspa-
pers Corp. v. Super. Ct., 159 P.2d 944, 950 (Cal. 1945) (referring to the "familiar contention
that the object is a mere 'fishing expedition' through his private papers").
207. SEC v. Oakford Corp., No. 00 Civ. 2426 (JSR) (HBP), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2818,
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2001).
208. See, e.g., Sorensen v. City of New York, No. 98 Civ. 3356 (HB), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
962, at *13 (S.D.N.Y.Jan. 22, 2003); Rhythm & Hues, Inc. v. Terminal Mktg. Co., No. 01 Civ.
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distraction, re-routing the discussion from the applicable legal test
to the question of whether someone was trying to fish.
In other cases, however, the "fishing" objection, which is tanta-
mount to an accusation of bad faith, puts the accused party on the
defensive. If the issue is pleading specificity, the party seeking
heightened detail should have to justify a departure from Rule 8's
notice pleading regime.00 If the issue is discovery, the party oppos-
ing discovery has the burden to substantiate its objection by
introducing evidence of burden, privilege, or immateriality.210 In-
stead, the rhetorical impact of the cry of "fishing expedition" is to
force the pleading or discovering party (usually the plaintiff) to
justify its actions. In this context, courts' words in earlier cases be-
come ammunition for the verbal attack.1
B. Weak Individual Cases
Cases that have serious problems on the merits, or serious
lawyering deficiencies, attract fishing metaphors. Sometimes the
facts surrounding a plaintiffs claim are so unappealing that it is
surprising a lawyer took the case, assuming the court has accurately
narrated both strengths and weaknesses of the parties' claims. In
other cases the lawyers have done such a poor job litigating that
one wonders why they failed to approach discovery more diligently.
Sometimes the courts' refusal to allow discovery makes a case un-
tenable, because without the requested information the plaintiff
has no evidence. Calling these cases "fishing expeditions" probably
does not hasten their doom, but it does add a connotation of bad
behavior to anything placed in the fishing category. This section
examines some of the weak cases that add to the taint of a "fishing"
accusation.
4697 (AGS), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10908, at *23 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2002); Boutvis v. Risk
Mgmt. Alternatives, Inc., No. CIVIL 3:01 CV 1933 (DJS), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8521, at *4
n.2 (D. Conn. May 3, 2002) ("The court further finds that defendant's dismissive description
of plaintiff's discovery requests as an 'improper fishing expedition' is factually and legally
incorrect.").
209. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (requiring only a "short and plain statement of the claim").
210. This is true to some extent even in Rule 56(f) cases, in which plaintiffs have the bur-
den to demonstrate how the additional requested discovery would disclose a genuine issue of
material fact. In responding to a "fishing" objection, they are defending against a claim of
wrongdoing, notjust specifying the link between the discovery and the issues in the case.
211. See supra Part 1.
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1. Bad Facts
Some cases, assuming the court's opinion fairly describes uncon-
tested facts, seemed destined to lose with or without being
criticized for "fishing." The "fishing" objection does not help to
resolve the case itself, and adds weight to the pejorative nature of
the metaphor. One such case is Grayson v. O'Neill, a race-
discrimination case brought against the Secret Service by the first
African-American to be Special Agent in Charge of the Chicago
office. 12 The court began by noting that the Service "received in
excess of 100 complaints" against plaintiff Grayson, and that an
investigation "revealed that Grayson not only intimidated and har-
assed his own employees, but also solicited favors from the public
he was charged to protect. 2 13 In addition, the opinion details nu-
merous specific accusations, prefacing them with: "The extent of
Grayson's improprieties cannot be fully appreciated without a
sampling of his numerous condemnable behaviors.,
214
It is not surprising, then, that the trial court granted summary
judgment (and the appellate court affirmed) despite denying the
plaintiff's request for discovery regarding Service members' par-
ticipation in "Good Ole' Boy Roundups," which included
extremely racist conduct. Grayson argued that white Special Agents
in Charge who had participated in such events were not disci-
plined, thus demonstrating that his punishment for misconduct
was discriminatory. The court responded: "Without any evidentiary
support, his request amounts to nothing more than a fishing expe-
dition and we decline to rule that the trial judge abused her
discretion in denying Grayson the opportunity to extend discovery
a fifth time.
2 1 5
The fishing metaphor does not add clarity to the court's analysis.
The ruling turns on the court's decision that the requested infor-
mation was not legally relevant. The court held that, even if the
Roundups could justify an inference of racism on the part of some
employees who did not supervise Grayson, or even systemic racism
on the part of the Secret Service, that evidence would not be
enough to show that race-neutral reasons for Grayson's treatment
were pretextual.1  Instead, by adding Grayson's situation to the
212. Grayson v. O'Neill, 308 E3d 808,811 (7th Cir. 2002).
213. Id.
214. Id. at812.
215. Id. at 817. One of the discovery extensions was at the request of the Service. Id.
216. The court recited Seventh Circuit law that "[e]vidence of generalized racism di-
rected at others is not relevant unless it has some relationship with the employment decision
in question." Id. at 816 (citing Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 E3d 956,973 (7th Cir. 1997)).
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"fishing" corpus, it associates all those who "fish" with a plaintiff
who abused his power and wasted the courts' time with a meridess
attempt at self-justification.
2. Bad Lawyering
The result in some "fishing" cases appeared to be influenced by
poor lawyering on behalf of the losing party. Using the "fishing"
label, though, adds an accusation of bad behavior to help justify
the court's belief about the merits. Often the problem is failure to
pursue the claim aggressively. One patent case, for example,
faulted the defendant's counterclaim:
[D]efendant's pursuit of these counterclaims has been half-
hearted and dilatory. It amended its complaint to add the
counterclaims although it could readily have asserted them in
its original answer. It has not proceeded promptly to pursue
discovery of the issue .... If defendant wants to justify a fish-
ing expedition it should at least have baited its hooks." '217
In another case, several inadequacies led to the "fishing" objec-
tion. Whether this was poor advocacy, or a lawyer with a losing
case, is not clear. In this Title VII hostile work environment case,
the court considered the plaintiffs opposition to summary judg-
ment:
Here, plaintiffs Rule 56(f) affidavit is deficient for several rea-
sons. First, plaintiff makes no attempt to show how the facts
sought are reasonably expected to create a genuine issue of
material fact. Instead, he states in a conclusory fashion that
obtaining the sworn statements [of two other African-
American employees] is 'necessary to prove [his] case, to
show discrimination and an issue of material fact.' ... Second,
217. Spring Windows Fashions LP v. Novo Indus., 249 E Supp. 2d 1111, 1113 (W.D. Wis.
2002). See also Metro. Antiques & Gems, Inc. v. Beaumont, No. 02 CIV. 3937 (DLC), 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24679, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2002) ("Nor is Metropolitan entitled to
discovery to try to develop a factual showing [of personal jurisdiction]. During the months
between the filing of the motion to dismiss and the plaintiffs opposition paper, the plaintiff
did not request the opportunity to take discovery. Given the inadequate factual and legal
presentation in Metropolitan's papers, it would appear that any discovery would be little
more than a fishing expedition.").
[VOL. 40:1
Just Say "No Fishing"
plaintiff has not offered a reasonable explanation for his fail-
2181
ure to obtain this discovery sooner.
The plaintiff also failed to file a memorandum of law or any
other written response in opposition to the motion for summary
judgment.219 Cumulatively, these failings convinced the court that
the plaintiff was merely fishing. Quoting an earlier case, the court
stated: "Rule 56(f) discovery is specifically designed to enable a
plaintiff to fill material evidentiary gaps in its case .... [I]t does
not permit a plaintiff to engage in a 'fishing expedition.' ' 220 This
line of cases lumps together lawyers whose cases are lost after their
own procedural default, and those who are diligently pursuing
cases in which most of the relevant information is in their oppo-
nents' hands. They are not just fishing, they are fishing poorly.
3. Lack of Evidence
Other weak individual cases use the fishing metaphor based on
the plaintiff's concession that he lacks evidence. A California ap-
pellate case affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs discrimination
complaint, after discovery, because he:
admitted that no one at the Bureau or the Department ever
made any comments or statements to him about his race, na-
tional origin, religion, ethnicity, color, or any other category
of group bias. He testified that his claims and actions were
founded on nothing other than speculation that statistical
evidence might prove that the Bureau tended to discriminate
in its hiring selections. To the extent plaintiff was permitted
by the charade of this meritless action to fish in the lake of
discovery, his speculations were disappointed.22'
218. Cooper v. John D. Brush & Co., 242 F. Supp. 2d 261, 266 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) (race
discrimination and hostile work environment case) (noting also that the court had already
given plaintiff an extension to do this discovery, and plaintiff had failed to do so).
219. Id. at 265.
220. Id. at 266 (quoting Capital Imaging Assocs. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., 725 F.
Supp. 669, 680 (N.D.N.Y. 1989)). Some of these cases also fit in the 'bad facts' pattern.
221. Singh v. Bureau for Private Post Secondary and Vocational Educ., No. E030056,
2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 502, at *13-14 (Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2003) (noting that plaintiff
Singh had not been hired because of his past serious misconduct as the director of a school
under defendant Bureau's jurisdiction). See also Munoz v. St. Mary-Corwin Hosp., 221 F.3d
1160 (10th Cir. 2000). In that case, the plaintiff doctor had received extensive negative re-
views as an intern that would justify the defendant hospital's hiring decision. Id. at 1169. The
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Other courts use the "fishing" label because they simply doubt
that the information needed by the plaintiff exists, and therefore
deny requests to try to find it. For example, in one case, employees
sued to recover on an alleged oral promise of additional pay for
22sales that exceeded a quota. After ruling that the oral contract
was unenforceable under the statute of frauds, the court dismissed
the case despite the plaintiffs' request for production of letters evi-
dencing the promise in company files, even though the plaintiffs
needed a writing to overcome the statute of frauds. The court rea-
soned: "It is improbable that the files of the defendant contain
memoranda or letters subscribed by defendant. It would seem that
plaintiffs have no knowledge of any such memoranda, but are
merely indulging in wishful expectations and are hoping to stave
off the dismissal of their complaint by applying for an examination
and inspection of the defendant's files which would be in the na-
ture of a fishing expedition."223 If no signed memorandum exists,
the court has saved the defendant from the expense of continued
litigation. If it does exist, the court has barred the plaintiffs from
accessing evidence that is crucial to prove their case. In neither
event does use of the fishing metaphor make it more appropriate
to cut off discovery in the case. 2 '4 And it again links the fishing
metaphor to frivolous litigation and questionable behavior.
court refused plaintiff's request for discovery of negative reviews of others over a five year
period:
When, as is apparent here, a plaintiff brings an initial action without any factual basis
evincing specific misconduct by the defendants and then bases extensive discovery
requests upon conclusory allegations in the hope of finding the necessary evidence of
misconduct, that plaintiff abuses the judicial process. Therefore, the magistrate judge
appropriately recognized that defendants' compliance was sufficient and the likely
benefit of any further attempted fishing expedition would be negligible."
Id.
222. McCants v. Emerol Mfg. Co., 81 N.Y.S.2d 770, 771 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
223. Id. Because the plaintiffs needed a "writing" to make the contract enforceable,
other kinds of discovery such as a deposition of the defendant would not have been helpful.
See also Addison v. Allstate Ins. Co., 97 E Supp. 2d 771, 775 (S.D. Miss. 2000) (refusing to
allow discovery from competitors' customers to try to show improper steering by Allstate);
Keaggy v. Lightcap, 181 A. 474 (Pa. 1935) (refusing to order discovery and an accounting).
224. See also Higgason v. Hanks, 54 F App'x 448, 449 (4th Cir. 2002) (rejecting plain-
tiff's challenge to prison discipline, characterizing plaintiff Higgason as "a frequent litigant
in this court," and referring to the "shopworn arguments that we have rejected repeatedly in
Higgason's previous appeals").
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C. Disfavored Cases-Pleading Facts in Detail
"Fishing expedition" is not a form of analysis; it is code lan-
guage. And the code has the potential to lead the court's analysis
astray. Whether headed that way on their own initiative or directed
there by a litigant, courts may follow lines of "fishing" cases that
cast a whole area of law in a negative light. Used often enough, the
fishing metaphor can influence (or reinforce) the attitudes of the
bench and bar enough to affect resolution on the merits in certain
types of litigation. The particular types of claims that are disfavored
vary over time. Currently it is antitrust, securities fraud, and em-
ployment discrimination cases that are treated as suspect in the
federal courts, while products liability cases are most likely to draw
the label in state courts.
1. Early Cases Threatening Family Privacy and Property Rights
The earliest uses of the metaphor occurred in equity cases that
were labeled "fishing bills." The eighteenth-century land title cases
depicted the plaintiffs as threatening property, invading privacy,
and disturbing the status quo. As noted earlier, Lord Chancellor
Loughborough lamented: "A spirit of prying into titles has got into
the Court, that is highly dangerous to the title of every man in Eng-
land. 2 25 Similarly, the fraudulent transfer cases initially involved
the somewhat unappealing principle that allowed subsequent
creditors to benefit from an insolvency that had not affected
them-so unappealing that the law later changed to require actual
fraud.2  These "fishing bills" threatened the party in possession of
property and required the disclosure of private information, often
to the detriment of widows and other surviving family members.227
The courts were more solicitous of the asset holders than of the
225. Renison v. Ashley, (1794) 30 Eng. Rep. 724, 725 (Ch.). See also Bravy, supra note 40,
at 521 ("Rules are laid down for the protection of persons who are in possession of estates to
protect them against attacks from persons who hoping to find some blot in their title some-
times bring actions against them without reasonable cause."); HARE, supra note 36, at 184
("It is often of the highest importance to the defendant that he be not compelled to disclose
documents which relate to the property in dispute, for the effect of such a disclosure may be
detrimental to that beneficial enjoyment of the property to which, as the party in possession,
he is entitled .... ").
226. See, e.g., Clement v. Cozart, 17 S.E. 486 (N.C. 1893) (tracing development of the
law regarding subsequent creditors and fraudulent conveyances).
227. See, e.g., Newkirk v. Willett, 2 Johns. Cas. 413, 413 (N.Y. 1800); Ryves v. Ryves,
(1797) 30 Eng. Rep. 1044, 1044 (Ch.); lvyv. Kekewick, (1795) 30 Eng. Rep. 839, 839 (Ch.).
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creditors. In one case, the plaintiff alleged that an insolvent hus-
band had wrongfully transferred property to his wife, and the court
replied by describing the danger of fishing:
Such a proposition would be a very unjust one to the wife still
under the dominion, control, and personal influence of the
husband. In receiving favors at his hands, which she supposed
to be the offerings of affection, or a proper provision for her
comfort, she would be subjecting that which was her own, or
which might afterwards come to her from other sources, to
unknown and unsuspected charges, of the amount and nature
of which she would be wholly ignorant.
22 9
In the early days, then, the fishing metaphor appeared in certain
types of litigation, and that litigation was openly limited for policy
reasons. The same is true in contemporary times: "fishing expedi-
tion" claims cluster in certain types of controversial cases, though
the policy arguments often seem less candid. Sometimes the
heightened pleading requirement that fuels the fishing metaphor
is statutory or rule-based, as in PSLRA and fraud cases. Other
times, however, the court is inventing its own pleading require-
ments and then reinforcing those requirements by way of the
fishing metaphor.
2. Statutory Heightened Pleading Requirements
Increased judicial scrutiny is statutorily mandated in some cases.
Securities fraud actions falling under the PSLRA, for example, re-
quire heightened pleading, and discovery is stayed during the
pendency of a motion to dismiss.50 Congress designed the Act to
discourage litigation that it believed to be speculative, and so the
228. Cf BANKR. R. 2004 (allowing examination of any entity regarding "the acts, con-
duct, or property or to the liabilities and financial condition of the debtor, or to any matter
which may affect the administration of the debtor's estate, or to the debtor's right to a dis-
charge"). Bankruptcy courts regularly hold that Rule 2004 examinations may properly be
used as "fishing expeditions." See, e.g., In reFearn, 96 B.R. 135, 137 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989).
229. Huntington v. Saunders, 120 U.S. 78, 81 (1886) (quoting Phipps v. Sedgwick, 95
U.S. 3, 9-10 (1877)).
230. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.). In addition, fraud claims have long required that the plaintiff plead the circum-
stances of fraud with particularity. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b). At least in theory, the plaintiff can
generally plead the defendant's condition of mind in a fraud case. Id. But see Ross v. A.H.
Robins Co., 607 F2d 545, 558 (2d Cir. 1979) (requiring heightened pleading of facts show-
ing defendant knew its statements were false).
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"fishing expedition" metaphor appears repeatedly.231 Sometimes
courts accuse plaintiffs of fishing and dismiss the cases before al-
lowing any discovery.3  Other times, particularly when the
government has preceded the private plaintiffs in investigating the
defendant, courts allow the cases and discovery to proceed. 33 But
in either case, the metaphor marks "fishing" as the undesirable
norm in securities fraud litigation. As the Ninth Circuit noted in
approving of one case's particularized pleadings, "this complaint
contains sufficient 'particularity' and 'incriminating facts' to dis-
tinguish the allegations from the countless 'fishing expeditions'
which the PSLRA was designed to deter.,
23 4
In disfavored types of litigation, the "fishing expedition" cases
feed on each other. Courts weave chains of citation to other cases
accusing plaintiffs of fishing, so that a presumption of bad faith
settles over the cause of action generally. For example, In re Camp-
bell Soup Company Securities Litigation quotes In re Theragenics
Corporation Securities Litigation2 3 6 to support a prohibition on fishing,
with Theragenics in turn citing Parnes v. Gateway 200 37 for its suspi-
cion of fishing, all in securities fraud cases. Sometimes the string
cites include additional kinds of disfavored cases. For instance,
Fishman v. Meinen, a securities fraud case, quotes Vicom, Inc. v.
239Harbridge Merchant Services, Inc., a RICO case, which in turn
231. Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEx. L. REv. 551, 600 (2002) (not-
ing courts' tendency to assume that securities fraud cases are frivolous). Determining
whether most cases are in fact frivolous is very difficult because very few private securities
class actions proceed to trial. See Charles M. Yablon, A Dangerous Supplement? Longshot Claims
and Private Securities Litigation, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 567, 572 (2000).
232. See, e.g., Ross, 607 E2d at 558.
233. See In re AOL Time Warner, Inc. Sec. & ERISA Litig., No. MDL-1500, 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2731, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2003) (quoting In re WorldCom Inc. Sec. Litig.,
234 F. Supp. 2d 301, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)). In both cases, the plaintiffs secured a partial lift-
ing of the discovery stay to access documents already turned over to the executive and
legislative branches of government. Both plaintiffs could therefore be absolved: they were
not "fishing." See also In re Enron Corp. Sec. Litig., No. MDL-1446, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
26261, at *31 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2002) (permitting discovery of documents already provided
to government investigators).
234. In re Daou Sys. Inc. Sec. Litig., 411 F.3d 1006,1024 (9th Cir. 2005).
235. In re Campbell Soup Co. Sec. Litig., 145 F. Supp. 2d 574, 595 (D.N.J. 2001).
236. In reTheragenics Corp. Sec. Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1349 (N.D. Ga. 2000).
237. Parnes v. Gateway, 122 F.3d 539, 549 (8th Cir. 1997).
238. Fishman v. Meinen, No. 02 C 3433, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2527, at *12 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 21, 2003).
239. Vicom, Inc. v. Harbridge Merch. Servs., Inc., 20 F.3d 771, 777 (7th Cir. 1994).
RICO cases, also disfavored, often use the fishing metaphor when requiring heightened
pleading specificity. See, e.g.,Jepson, Inc. v. Makita Corp., 34 F.3d 1321, 1327 (7th Cir. 1994)
(RICO predicate act of mail fraud).
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quotes securities cases that express fear of strike suits (but not of
"fishing") .240
Courts dismissing cases for "fishing" do more than indicate that
the plaintiffs lacked sufficient factual foundation to meet the
pleading requirements. The metaphor implies that the plaintiffs
acted irresponsibly and with impure motive.24' Countless PSLRA
plaintiffs must begin by rebutting the "fishing expedition" label,
and careful judges have to consciously note that the Act "was not
enacted to raise the pleading burdens ... to such a level that fa-
cially valid claims, which are not brought for nuisance value or as
leverage to obtain a favorable or inflated settlement, must be rou-
tinely dismissed on Rule 9(b) and 12(b) (6) motions."2 42
3. Judge-Made Heightened Pleading Requirements
Other categories of suspect cases are judge-made, and they re-
quire particularized pleading without statutory or rule-based
justifications for doing so. These cases frequently use fishing meta-
phors. Private antitrust claims, for example, fall into this
243category. Like the securities fraud cases, antitrust cases often cite
to earlier "fishing" cases when using fishing metaphors. For exam-
ple, DJ Manufacturing Corp. v. Tex-Shield, Inc.2" quotes DM Research,
Inc. v. College of American Pathologists.2 45 Similarly, Network Computing
240. This is not surprising, since the prohibition of "fishing" stems from a fear of abu-
sive litigation like "stricke suits." See e.g., Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int'l, 248 F.3d 321,
326 (4th Cir. 2001). Migda a suit brought under the Investment Company Act, quotes DM
Research, Inc. v. College of American Pathologists, 170 E3d 53, 55 (1st Cir. 1999), a much-cited
antitrust "fishing" case.
241. This implication in securities fraud cases seems particularly unfortunate given the
courts' serious splits over the required degree of detail and given the fact that evidence of
intent is often in the defendant's hands and available only after at least limited discovery. See
Fairman, supra note 231, at 608. See alsoJoseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes With
Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of Amniguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54
STAN. L. REv. 627, 634, 674-80 (2002) (arguing that the theoretically procedural height-
ened pleading standard in the PSLRA actually has the substantive result of increasing the
scienter requirement).
242. ABC Arbitrage Plaintiffs Group v. Tchuruk, 291 F.3d 336, 354 (5th Cir. 2002) (not-
ing with a "cf." signal the observation in In re Campbell Soup Co. Sec. Litig., 145 F. Supp. 2d
574, 595 (D.NJ. 2001), that "the PSLRA's goal [is to] flush out suits which are built on mere
speculation and conclusory allegations and which aim to use discovery as a fishing expedi-
tion to substantiate frivolous claims").
243. See, e.g., DM Research, Inc. v. Coll. of Am. Pathologists, 170 F.3d 53, 55 (1st Cir.
1999); Network Computing Servs. Corp. v. Cisco Sys., 223 F.R.D. 392, 395 n.5 (D.S.C. 2004);
Fare Deals, Ltd. v. Glorioso, 217 F. Supp. 2d 670, 671 (D. Md. 2002); DJ Mfg. Corp. v. Tex-
Shield, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 109, 120 (D.P.R. 2002); In reIBM Peripheral EDP Devices Anti-
trust Litig., 77 F.R.D. 39, 4-42 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
244. DJMfg. Corp., 275 F. Supp. at 120.
245. DM Research, Inc., 170 F.3d at 55.
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Services Corp. v. Cisco Systems14" quotes In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices
Antitrust Litigation for its extended fishing metaphor: "Even if one
is entitled to embark on a fishing expedition, one must at least use
'rod and reel, or even a reasonably sized net[; not] drain the pond
and collect the fish from the bottom.,147 As with the securities fraud
cases, the "fishing" label marks antitrust claims as suspect. Unlike
securities fraud claims, however, antitrust cases have little support
for the heightened pleading requirement.
In antitrust cases, courts requiring great factual specificity be-
lieve they are authorized to do so by a Supreme Court footnote in
Associated General Contractors of California v. California State Council of
Carpenters.18 Even after the Supreme Court generally rejected
judge-made heightened pleading rules in Leatherman v. Tarrant
County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Uni" 9 and again in
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A. 25 0 heightened pleading practice contin-
ues to thrive in antitrust cases, aided by the "fishing expedition"
metaphor.25'
D. Disfavored Cases-Limiting Discovery Relevance
In addition to reinforcing decisions that require greater specific-
ity in pleading, 'no fishing' also appears as a reason to limit or
deny discovery. This is particularly true when the plaintiff must es-
tablish some level of knowledge or intent by the defendant.
Lacking a "smoking gun," the plaintiffs in these cases seek broad
background information to establish a pattern of behavior, and
defendants perceive such requests as excessive. Two of the best ex-
amples are employment discrimination cases and products liability
cases.
246. Network Computing Servs. Corp., 223 F.R.D. at 395 n.5.
247. In re IBM, 77 F.R.D. at 42. See also In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price
Antitrust Litig., 138 F. Supp. 2d 25, 28 (D. Me. 2001) (quoting DMResearch, Inc., 170 F.3d at
53).
248. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S.
519, 528 n.17 (1983).
249. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507
U.S. 163, 168 (1993).
250. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 507 (2002).
251. See Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARiz. L. REv. 987, 1011-
21 (2003). The Court has recently granted certiorari to review a heightened pleading issue
in an antitrust case. Twombly v. Bell Ad. Corp., 425 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. granted, No.
05-1126, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 4911 (June 26, 2006).
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1. Employment Discrimination
The discovery-related "fishing" cases often raise issues of discov-
ery relevance. More specifically, they tend to consider how similar
the requested information must be to the plaintiffs claims before
it will be discoverable. For example, in Pedraza v. Holiday House-
wares, Inc., the plaintiff sued his employer, Holiday Housewares, for
discrimination based on national origin and sexual orientation.
Holiday Housewares shared a president and management employ-
ees with a related company, Plastican. 2" The plaintiff learned
during a deposition that at least five lawsuits had been filed against
Plastican based on national origin or sexual harassment.254 The
plaintiff asked to take additional depositions in order to discover
whether those claims were similar to his, either in the identity of
the accused wrongdoers or in the nature of the allegations, so that
he could establish a pattern and practice of discrimination. 25 The
court denied this request, remarking that the plaintiffs motion
"bespeaks of a possible fishing expedition into what appear to be





Plaintiffs making claims of discriminatory treatment, as opposed
to disparate impact, often find their discovery requests rejected as
"fishing." In Hill v. Motel 6, an age discrimination case, the plaintiff
was fired from his position as an area manager."7 He alleged that
corporate management had discriminated against him, and he
asked to discover the personnel files of all Motel 6 area managers
and all complaints or charges of age discrimination filed with the
government or other agencies. 258 The court limited discovery to
employees supervised by the plaintiffs immediate supervisor.25 9 To
do otherwise, the court believed, would be disturbing "the balance
struck between a party's right to discovery with the need to prevent
'fishing expeditions."'2 60 If the court's decision was merely about
logical relevance, which it appears to be, the use of the fishing
metaphor confuses rather than clarifies its analysis.




256. Id. at 42.
257. Hill v. Motel 6,205 F.R.D. 490,493 (S.D. Ohio 2001).
258. Id. at 492.
259. Id. at 495.
260. Id. at 492 n.2 (quoting Bush v. Dictaphone Corp., 161 F.3d 363, 367 (6th Cir.
1998)) (internal quotations omitted).
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Likewise, the court in Boyd v. American Airlines, Inc. limited dis-
covery in a racial harassment and discrimination suit. 6 ' The
plaintiff sought to discover complaints of racial harassment or ra-
cially hostile work environment throughout the continental United
States, but the court only allowed discovery of complaints originat-
ing from the places where the plaintiffs alleged harassment
occurred . The plaintiff sought the information about American's
nationwide operations to rebut the defense that the company used
reasonable care to prevent and correct harassing behavior. 3 The
court, however, held: "Plaintiffs request in the instant matter is
merely a fishing expedition.",2 " The plaintiff was thereby deprived
of information she might have used to show that American's efforts
in the Dallas area were inadequate.
As was true with the securities fraud and antitrust cases, "fishing"
citations in employment discrimination cases build on each other.
In addition to the examples noted above, Adams v. Giant Food,
Inc.2 6; quotes an earlier employment case, Morrow v. Farrell.266 The
case of Pleasants v. Allbaugh, which claimed race discrimination in
federal employment,267 quotes Hardrick v. Legal Services Corp., an-
other race discrimination case. 268 Decisions in cases alleging other
types of discrimination also cite to strings of "fishing" cases to im-
ply bad faith.
261. Boyd v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 3-01-CV-2230-D, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19937, at *5
(N.D. Tex. Oct. 17, 2002).
262. Id. at*l-5.
263. Id. at *2.
264. Id. at *4 (quoting Spina v. Our Lady of Mercy Med. Ctr., No. 97 CIV 4661 (RCC),
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7338, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2001)). See also Adams v. Giant Food,
Inc., 225 F. Supp. 2d 600, 607 (D. Md. 2002). In that case, plaintiffs claimed they were dis-
charged on the basis of race, and the employer argued that the plaintiffs had improperly
charged for time when they were on break or sleeping. Id. at 602. Plaintiffs requested dis-
covery regarding white female employees who also falsified time cards, but the court held
that it was not discoverable because those employees-unlike the plaintiffs-were on day
rather than night shift and were supervised rather than unsupervised. Id. at 603. The court
explained: "[T]he purpose of rule 56(f) is not to allow the non-moving party to engage in a
fishing expedition." Id. at 607.
265. Id.
266. Morrow v. Farrell, 187 F. Supp. 2d 548, 551 (D. Md. 2002).
267. Pleasants v. Allbaugh, 208 F.R.D. 7,8-9 (D.D.C. 2002).
268. Hardrick v. Legal Services Corp., 96 F.R.D. 617, 618 (D.D.C. 1983).
269. See, e.g., McGee v. Hayes, 43 F. App'x 214 (10th Cir. 2002) (alleging discrimination
in the denial of a building permit) (quoting Munoz v. St. Mary-Corwin Hosp., 221 F.3d 1160,
1169 (10th Cir. 2000) (employment discrimination) (citingJarvis v. Nobel/Sysco Food Servs.
Co., 985 F.2d 1419, 1423 n.4 (10th Cir. 1993) (breach of duty of fair representation))).
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2. Products Liability
Products liability discovery disputes have similar patterns in
terms of judicial "fishing" accusations. As in the employment set-
ting, discoverability turns on relevance. Here the discovery disputes
tend to involve which products are sufficiently similar to the one
that allegedly injured the plaintiff, or what time period is suffi-
ciently material to justify the burden of compliance. For example,
the plaintiff in Orleman v. Jumpking, Inc. suffered a spinal cord in-
jury while using a Jumpking trampoline and sued for negligence,
strict liability, and breach of warranty: 7° He sought to discover pre-
vious lawsuits or claims brought against the defendant as a result of
trampoline injuries during the past fifteen years. 27' The court nar-
rowed the scope of discovery to the particular make of trampoline
on which the plaintiff was injured and "substantially similar" mod-
els, and to a shorter time period, noting that the generally broad
scope of discovery "should not be misapplied to allow a fishing ex-
pedition in discovery."
2 72
In the same manner, the Texas Supreme Court has narrowed
discovery in tort cases. In Texaco, Inc. v. Sanderson, the court held
that a document production request in a workplace toxic tort case
for "all documents written by defendant's safety director concern-
ing 'safety, toxicology, and industrial hygiene, epidemiology, fire
protection and training'" was too broad, and the court character-
ized the original request as "an effort to dredge the lake in hopes
of finding a fish. 2 71 In another Texas mass tort case, 140 plaintiffs
claimed asbestos-related injuries and requested documents about
all of the defendant's products.2 4 Because the request included
products that the plaintiffs had not yet claimed to have used and
locations at which the plaintiffs had not worked, the court con-
cluded that the plaintiffs' request "constitute [d] the type of fishing
275
expedition prohibited" by its earlier cases.
270. Orleman v. Jumpking, Inc., No. 99-2522-CM, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11081, at *1
(D. Kan. July 22, 2000).
271. Id. at *4.
272. Id. at *6-7 (citing Hofer v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 981 F.2d 377, 380 (8th Cir. 1992)).
See also Anderson v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1192,1195 (D. Kan. 2001).
273. Texaco, Inc. v. Sanderson, 898 S.W.2d 813, 815 (Tex. 1995). See also Am. Med. Sys.,
Inc. v. Osborne, 651 So. 2d 209, 211 (Fla. Ct. App. 1995).
274. In reAm. Optical Corp., 988 S.W.2d 711, 713 (Tex. 1998).
275. Id. Texas is especially enamored of the "fishing expedition" metaphor, and the
courts' string cites reinforce each other. American Optica4 for example, quotes K Mart Corp. v.
Sanderson, 937 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Tex. 1996) (premises liability), DiUard Department Stores, Inc.
v. Hall, 909 S.W.2d 491,492 (1995) (false arrest), and Texaco, 898 S.W.2d at 815 (toxic tort).
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In essence, the courts are deciding, without knowing what dis-
covery would disclose, that no reasonable factfinder could rely on
the information sought to support the inference the plaintiff needs
to prove her case, nor could the discovery reasonably be expected
216to lead to evidence that would do so. Given this presumed low
degree of materiality, the court may also be concluding that the
burden of complying with the request outweighs its probable im-
portance. 7
By using the fishing metaphor, the court avoids explaining its
reasoning more clearly. The metaphor indicates not only that the
court doubts the logical materiality of the information, but also
that the requests are frivolous or ethically questionable. s The
cases thus become precautionary tales, warning plaintiffs not to
argue that the corporate culture of an employer is relevant to a
claim of discrimination, that a company's awareness of potential
defects in one product is relevant to those in a similar one, or that
a company's knowledge and behavior in one location is relevant to
others. Some cases that use the "fishing expedition" metaphor un-
doubtedly reach the right result, while others are arguable at best.
The metaphor is harmful both when it obscures the court's actual
reasoning and when it becomes another link in a chain of "fishing"
accusations that warp the judicial system's attitude toward entire
categories of cases.
III. CAN THE METAPHOR BE SAVED?
The time-honored cry of "fishing expedition" is still more
than capable of preventing discovery and heading off lawsuits
altogether. Metaphorically speaking, fishing expeditions can
be "vexatious, "massive, "burdensome, expensive,
276. Cf. FED. R. EviD. 401 (providing that evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence"); FED. R. Civ. P.
26(b) (1) (providing the discovery relevance standard).
277. Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (3) (providing proportionality considerations).
278. Two of the employment cases also accuse plaintiffs of trying to "roam in the
shadow zones of relevancy." Boyd v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 3-01-CV-2230-D, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19937, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 17, 2002) (quoting Spina v. Our Lady of Mercy Med.
Ctr., No. 97 CIV 4661 (RCC), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7338, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.June 6, 2001); Hill
v. Motel 6,205 F.R.D. 490, 493 (S.D. Ohio 2001) (quoting Blum v. Schlegel, 150 F.R.D. 38, 39
(W.D.N.Y 1993)).
279. Ryvesv. Ryves, (1797) 30Eng. Rep. 1044,1046 (Ch.).
280. Bostic v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 87 F. Supp. 2d 611,613 (S.D.W. Va. 2000).
281. EEOC v. Autozone, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 822,830 (W.D. Tenn. 2003).
282. Madrid v. Chronicle Books, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1236 (D. Wyo. 2002).
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classic," 2  invasive, spurious, "wide-ranging, ''286 "transpar-
ent, '287  "blind,, 28  "old-fashioned,, 28 9  "unbridled,, 29°  or
experimental."2' Courts also use the ever-popular "mere fishing
expedition. 282 The adjectives serve to highlight, in a colorful or
dramatic way, the unacceptable behavior of those who fish. In addi-
tion, the metaphor portrays the objecting parties (and not the
information sought) as the hapless fish: "[W]hen the fish objects
... the fisherman is called upon to justify his pursuit."293 Fishing is
clearly a Bad Thing.
On those rare occasions in which courts allow fishing, their tone
is permissive but not encouraging. A fishing expedition can be
'justifiable" 4 or "appropriate., 295 Even the drafters of the federal
discovery rules did not create a linguistic system in which fishing
was desirable. Instead, they criticized the metaphor.96 Nowhere do
we find cases praising fishing expeditions as 'skillful,' 'thorough,'
'creative,' or 'laudable.'
Over the centuries, the legal fishing metaphor has both changed
and stayed the same. The acts condemned as fishing have changed
dramatically. Lawsuits no longer require detailed fact pleading to
demonstrate that the plaintiff already has all of the necessary evi-
dence. Discovery is no longer limited to a party's own case, the
admission of specific information, or the production of identified
283. Sorensen v. City of New York, No. 98 Civ. 3356 (HB), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 962, at
*12 (S.D.N.Y.Jan. 22, 2003).
284. Wyoming v. USDA, 208 ER.D. 449,453 (D.D.C. 2002).
285. Fare Deals, Ltd. v. Glorioso, 217 F. Supp. 2d 670, 671 (D. Md. 2002).
286. Monarch Assurance P.L.C. v. United States, 244 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
287. Forthmann v. Boyer, 118 Cal. Rptr. 715, 721 (Ct. App. 2002).
288. Smith v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 113 Cal. Rptr. 399, 418 (Ct. App. 2001); In
re Fuqua Indus., Inc. Shareholder Litig., No. 11974, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 52, at *18-19 (Ch.
May 2, 2002).
289. In re Best Lock Corp. Shareholder Litig., No. 16281, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 175, at
*15 (Ch. Dec. 18,2000).
290. Saratoga Harness Racing, Inc. v. Roemer, 711 N.Y.S.2d 603, 605 (App. Div. 2000).
291. ExparteBrooks, 32 So. 2d 534, 536 (Ala. 1947).
292. See, e.g., Addison v. Allstate Ins. Co., 97 F. Supp. 2d 771, 774, 775 (S.D. Miss. 2000);
Terry v. Stull, 169 A. 739, 741 (Del. Ch. 1933); Landry v. Ozenne, 195 So. 14, 19 (La. 1940);
State ex relLaughoin v. Sartorious, 119 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938); Phillips v. Cur-
tis, 75 N.Y.S. 551, 554 (Sup. Ct. 1902); Continental Bank of N.Y. v. Myerle, 51 N.Y.S. 497, 499
(App. Div. 1898); Phalen v. Roberts, 47 N.Y.S. 780, 781 (App. Div. 1897); Newkirk v. Willett, 2
Johns. Cas. 413, 416 (N.Y. 1800); Kelly v. Ingersoll, 1878 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 116 at *2 (Ct.
C.P. 1878).
293. Patterson v. Burge, No. 03 C 4433, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1331, at *5 (N.D. Il. Jan.
5, 2005) (citing Nw. Mem. Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 931 (7th Cir. 2004)). See also ln re
Initial Public Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F Supp. 2d 281, 326 n.46 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
294. InreMerkle, 19 P. 401,402 (Kan. 1888).
295. United States v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., No. 99-5 MMS, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6925, at
*13-14 (D. Del. May 10, 2000).
296. See supra text accompanying notes 121-123.
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documents. Yet the image of the overreaching or unscrupulous
fishing expedition remains, harking back to an older way of judg-
ing pleadings and discovery.
The fishing metaphor is at best a distraction. Its uses are too
tired and formulaic to add new insight to judicial opinions or
commentary. Describing the U.S. civil litigation system as one that
foolishly allows "fishing" is a harmful caricature.97 As a pervasive
legal metaphor, however, it structures the way we think when we
consider what it means to file a lawsuit or request information
needed to prove legal claims.
Can the legal system instead reclaim the positive aspect of fish-
ing? Such an effort might begin by getting more serious about the
nature of literal fishing. Whether one fishes for a living or for
sport, fishing is a targeted activity. Those who fish go to places
known to have fish, use bait tailored to the expected fish, and em-
ploy techniques designed to maximize the quality and quantity of
the catch. People fish for a living, and the ones who succeed blend
knowledge, hard work, and skill. Devotees of fly fishing would go
further and claim that fishing blends skill and art, invoking a
sixth sense that takes human effort to a higher plane. To
Think Like a Fish (and therefore know where to find one) is a
gift of cultivated instinct.... The mind is like a computer
crammed with so many fish facts that it suddenly produces an
insight that depends on those facts but leaps beyond them.9
Perhaps recognition of the informed targeting, talent, and art in-
volved in fishing could help to neutralize the metaphor.
Even as a metaphor, the concept of fishing is not invariably
negative outside the legal context. Christian scriptures describe
Jesus as instructing his followers to become "fishers of men."29  Lit-
erature contains positive uses of metaphorical fishing. For
example, John Donne in The Bait portrays his lover as a skilled
fisher:
Let others freeze with angling reeds,
And cut their legs with shells and weeds,
Or treacherously poor fish beset,
With strangling snare, or windowy net...
297. See Stephen N. Subrin, Discovery in Global Perspective: Are We Nuts?, 52 DEPAUL L.
REv. 299, 301-09 (2002).
298. Holly Morris, Fumbling After Grace: Fishing and Writing, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1997,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/books/97/06/O8/bookend/bookend.html.
299. Matthew4:19; Markl:17. See also Luke5:2-11.
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For thee, thou need'st no such deceit,
For thou thyself art thine own bait:
That fish, that is not catch'd thereby,
Alas! is wiser far than 1.
300
Virginia Woolf in A Room of One's Own used fishing as a meta-
phor for thinking. 3°' A recent popular novel30 2 used fishing (along
with hunting) to represent the heroine's "spirited search for true
love, self-understanding, and a fulfilling career.03
Everyday use of the fishing metaphor is more neutral than the
legal use. Metaphorical fishing belongs to a larger metaphoric sys-
tem in which a problem is portrayed as a body of water and solving
the problem is characterized as looking for an object in water. For
example, investigating a problem is described as an exploration of
water ("He dived right into the problem"); the solution is an object
in water ("The answer's just floating around out there"); and diffi-
culty in solving a problem is represented by difficulty in exploring
water ("The murky waters of the investigation frustrated him") .304
In this system, fishing is just an attempt to solve the problem:
"He'd been fishing for the answer for weeks." This usage appears
in many contexts. For example, job hunting or dating is described
as "fishing," with a good result being a "good catch" or "landing" a
goodjob.300 "The one that got away" is generally seen as a desirable
and legitimate object of pursuit. Seen in this light, fishing is not
subversive or underhanded but the process of finding an answer. A
few of the legal metaphors assume this more neutral tone when
300. John Donne, The Bait, I POEMS OF JOHN DONNE 47 (E.K. Chambers ed., George
Rutledge & Sons 1904) (1896). Consider also T.S. Eliot's complex use of the Fisher King
image in The Waste Land. T.S. Eliot, The Waste Land, part V, 11. 424-25 (1922). In a note at the
end of the poem, Eliot cited the work ofJessie L. Weston, which explores the religious sym-
bolism of the Fisher King. JESSIE L. WESTON, FROM RITUAL TO ROMANCE ch. 9 (Doubleday
1957) (1920). It is the Fisher King upon whom the health and fertility of the land and peo-
ple depend. See generally Rickard A. Parker, Exploring The Waste Land,
http://world.std.com/-raparker/exploring/thewasteland/explore.html (last visited August
6, 2006).
301. VIRGINIA WOOLF, A RooM OF ONE'S OWN 5 (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1981)
(1929) ("Thought... had let its line down into the stream.").
302. MELISSA BANKS, THE GiRLs' GUIDE TO HUNTING AND FISHING (1999).
303. ReadingGroupGuides.com, Book Review, http://www.readinggroupguides.com/
guides/girlsguidetohuntingand.fishing.asp (last visited Feb. 2, 2006).
304. Conceptual Metaphor Home Page, A Problem Is a Body of Water,
http://cogsci.berkeley.edu/lakoff/metaphors/AProblemIs_ABody_OLWater (last vis-
ited Feb. 2, 2006).
305. Tameri Guide for Writers, Figurative Language, http://www.tameri.com/edit/
figurative.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2006).
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describing the activities of lawyers. For example, lawyers attempt to
fill their baskets,"""" bait their hooks,0 7 and cast their lines."8
Changing the metaphor's impact, if in fact change is possible,
will require a collective act of will.3 0 9 If we continue to think of cer-
tain litigation conduct as fishing, we should imagine the skilled,
artful, efficient fisher, looking for the right things in the right
places. The image would be not a "dragnet"3 0 but a skillful cast,
and the issue not whether parties are fishing but how well they fish.
"Catching" information that establishes a cause of action would
enforce legal norms rather than impose a disfavored transaction
cost. Stripped of its pejorative slant, fishing would become a neu-
tral concept rather than a prohibited act. In this way, it might
become a more equitable tool in the difficult task of deciding
which cases are allowed to go forward.
CONCLUSION
It would be far better, however, to remove the 'No Fishing' sign
entirely from the shores of legal discourse. As the Supreme Court
noted in Hickman back in 1947, it is a "time-honored cry"31 and too
deeply embedded in our collective consciousness to be easily trans-
formed into 'Fisherfolk Welcome.' While the metaphor may have
started "as a device to liberate thought," it has ended by "enslaving
it.", 1 2 It is time for the fishing metaphor-with its uncatchable
fish-to swim away to inaccessible waters and never raise its head
again.
306. Phalen v. Roberts, 47 N.YS. 780, 781 (App. Div. 1897).
307. Spring Windows Fashions LP v. Novo Indus., 249 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1113 (W.D. Wis.
2002).
308. Marsalis v. Wilson, 778 N.E.2d 612, 618 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002). See also Walter v. Wal-
ter, 127 S.W.3d 396, 399 (Tex. App. 2004) ("Although appellant is a licensed attorney, a law
license is not a fishing license.").
309. Berger, supra note 5, at 207 ("Rather than a wholly new metaphor, cognitive theory
... suggests ways to re-view a current metaphor.").
310. Benbow v. Aspen Tech., Inc., No. 02-2881, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17936, at *11
(E.D. La. Oct. 7, 2003).
311. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
312. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.) (rejecting
the metaphor of a "parent" corporation acting through an "alias" or "dummy" subsidiary as
a basis for liability).
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